Assuming you are an American citizen, the relevant law is something like:
Nothing contained in this title [regarding mandatory military service] shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.
In particular, you must show that your position is a deeply held moral conviction opposing war in all circumstances, not just opposition to a particular war. GILLETTE v. UNITED STATES, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
For reasons similar to Barbarians shouldn’t win, I can’t endorse trying to fake being a pacifist (additionally, the false statements you would need to make would be separate crimes from failure to report for service).
But if you really oppose all war, you’ll need to justify it with testimony (written or oral), and your prior behaviors won’t be all that relevant. Pr(excused from service as conscientious objector | my prior conscientious objector behavior) is low. Pr(excused from service as conscientious objector | compelling descriptions of your relevant personal beliefs) is orders of magnitude higher.
Based on this, it appears that only overt religious signaling is acceptable for being declared a conscientious objector. I don’t believe in any Supreme Being, so I don’t know where that leaves me in this description. I am ideologically and ethically opposed to war, and in particular to the military experience of serving in the American armed forces. I don’t think it would be insincere or any sort of false testimony risk for me to claim that I am opposed.
My post is about what one should supply as “testimony” in your comment. It doesn’t look like you can just give a verbal description of your reasons for war opposition and expect that to suffice. You have to back it up by referring to specific beliefs or habits that indicate a whole long-running pattern of pacifism. I am just trying to think about what actions I must do now such that my conscientious objection beliefs are sufficiently conveyed by those actions (assuming that I testify about them).
Maybe I am misunderstanding your point. It seems like you’ve given a good description of the standards that are currently used, except that we need to unpack what “testimony” means and to what extent there must be evidence to back up statements of belief or conviction. But I don’t see anything in your comment that address what one should do about it (if anything) preemptively.
If you have a sincere moral objection to the use of political violence (such as war) in any circumstances, then you qualify as a conscientious objector under US law (as of 1947, but I’m doubtful it has changed much). Religion is the primary historical example of this philosophy, but is not the only legally acceptable source.
I don’t believe in any Supreme Being, so I don’t know where that leaves me in this description.
Go read Welsh. One or both of the defendants refused to assert belief in a Supreme Being, but was allowed to become a conscientious objector.
It doesn’t look like you can just give a verbal description of your reasons for war opposition and expect that to suffice. You have to back it up by referring to specific beliefs or habits that indicate a whole long-running pattern of pacifism.
I don’t see a requirement to prove a habit. Sincere beliefs are sufficient—for exactly the reasons you are highlighting. Before the need for signalling, a true pacifist has no need (and little ability) to signal. After the need for signalling, when war is looming, behavioral signals are too cheap to be reliable measures of sincerity.
we need to unpack what “testimony” means and to what extent there must be evidence to back up statements of belief or conviction.
Again, consider reading Welsh. There’s some description of the most important and relevant things the draftees said, and some description of the bureaucratic process they went through.
If the situation came up, I expect you would be put under oath to tell the truth, and questioned. If your beliefs a consider sincere by the hearing officer, you can be a conscientious objector and avoid the draft. The risk you run is that you won’t be believed, but I genuinely doubt a donation to any particular charity will make that much difference. First, there aren’t that many pacifist charities. Second, one could donate to anti-landmine advocacy groups even if one isn’t a pacifist.
I don’t see anything in your comment that address what one should do about it (if anything) preemptively.
I doubt the national head of the US Pacifism League (or its actually existing equivalent) will have any trouble avoiding a draft. Short of that level of commitment to pacifism, there’s not much you can do but thinking about what you would say under oath. Maybe post versions of it publicly in a relevant forum?
Before the need for signalling, a true pacifist has no need (and little ability) to signal. After the need for signalling, when war is looming, behavioral signals are too cheap to be reliable measures of sincerity.
Is this really true? Building up a history of pacifism donations during times when war is not looming is hardly a cheap signal. One could easily check a bank account to verify that you didn’t just immediately start donating now that the threat of conscription is actually credible. And if you are a pacifist, then you probably would get significant negative utils from military conscription. So “before the need” is ill-defined. If you place a high value on never being conscripted, then in some sense you “need” to do things to lower that probability.
[Joining the Quakers] would be a money-cheap way to signal pacifism, but for me it is a socially-expensive way to attempt it. Paying for donations to orgs would probably be cheaper overall in my preference ordering.
For better or worse, this kind of willingness to do trade-offs in your ordinary life makes it seem more like a personal philosophy (not protected) rather than a duty higher than human relationships (which is protected). Your core concern is projecting sincerity, which is socially expensive.
In my case, because I am sincere, I feel the need to make sure that I seem sincere. I agree that, societally, we often think that a wish to seem sincere implies lack of genuine sincerity. That’s why I would only ask this question in the confines of a place like LessWrong, where other users might more frequently understand that thinking carefully and planning to seem sincere does not necessarily mean that you aren’t actually sincere. As Andrew Gelman likes to say, “Just because it is counterintuitive doesn’t make it true!”
This is precisely why I think it is an interesting problem. If you are a sincere person but you do not believe in “higher than human” duties in the senses that are traditionally used to qualify as a conscientious objector, and you believe you need to do something to better the odds of qualification, what should you do?
The complainer in me wants to also stamp my feet about how unfair it is to be penalized for willingness to do tradeoffs. I don’t like penalizing people for taking a decision seriously and making well-conceived plans.
I’m sympathetic to your problem. Perhaps the only useful advice I’ve given you is that spending money is not perceived as correlating with sincerity in this context. Just about any relevant non-monetary act would be better for your purposes.
spending money is not perceived as correlating with sincerity in this context. Just about any relevant non-monetary act would be better for your purposes.
Yes. People treat money differently than other things, because with money they understand the fungibility: you make trade-offs all the time, whether to buy this thing or that thing—so it is easy to imagine that any financial decision you did was a similar conscious trade-off.
Other things seem different. On LW we try to understand that they are not so completely different, but for the communication with the non-LW world it is important to remember how they see it.
For example, for a rationalist spending one week creating an anti-war website should be equivalent to spending one week working at some job and paying the money to someone else to create the website. The only thing that matters is the effect of the resulting website. However for most people, spending a week of your time creating the website (unless you are a professional website-maker) signals that you care, while paying someone else does not work this way. (Paying someone else may be a rational decision, but people assume that if you cared, you would prefer to do everything first-hand, even if that would be an irrational decision. This is how people model emotions of others; and this model is rather correct for a non-rationalist.)
Assuming you are an American citizen, the relevant law is something like:
take from Welsh v. United States, 398 US 333 (1947)
In particular, you must show that your position is a deeply held moral conviction opposing war in all circumstances, not just opposition to a particular war. GILLETTE v. UNITED STATES, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
For reasons similar to Barbarians shouldn’t win, I can’t endorse trying to fake being a pacifist (additionally, the false statements you would need to make would be separate crimes from failure to report for service).
But if you really oppose all war, you’ll need to justify it with testimony (written or oral), and your prior behaviors won’t be all that relevant. Pr(excused from service as conscientious objector | my prior conscientious objector behavior) is low. Pr(excused from service as conscientious objector | compelling descriptions of your relevant personal beliefs) is orders of magnitude higher.
Based on this, it appears that only overt religious signaling is acceptable for being declared a conscientious objector. I don’t believe in any Supreme Being, so I don’t know where that leaves me in this description. I am ideologically and ethically opposed to war, and in particular to the military experience of serving in the American armed forces. I don’t think it would be insincere or any sort of false testimony risk for me to claim that I am opposed.
My post is about what one should supply as “testimony” in your comment. It doesn’t look like you can just give a verbal description of your reasons for war opposition and expect that to suffice. You have to back it up by referring to specific beliefs or habits that indicate a whole long-running pattern of pacifism. I am just trying to think about what actions I must do now such that my conscientious objection beliefs are sufficiently conveyed by those actions (assuming that I testify about them).
Maybe I am misunderstanding your point. It seems like you’ve given a good description of the standards that are currently used, except that we need to unpack what “testimony” means and to what extent there must be evidence to back up statements of belief or conviction. But I don’t see anything in your comment that address what one should do about it (if anything) preemptively.
If you have a sincere moral objection to the use of political violence (such as war) in any circumstances, then you qualify as a conscientious objector under US law (as of 1947, but I’m doubtful it has changed much). Religion is the primary historical example of this philosophy, but is not the only legally acceptable source.
Go read Welsh. One or both of the defendants refused to assert belief in a Supreme Being, but was allowed to become a conscientious objector.
I don’t see a requirement to prove a habit. Sincere beliefs are sufficient—for exactly the reasons you are highlighting. Before the need for signalling, a true pacifist has no need (and little ability) to signal. After the need for signalling, when war is looming, behavioral signals are too cheap to be reliable measures of sincerity.
Again, consider reading Welsh. There’s some description of the most important and relevant things the draftees said, and some description of the bureaucratic process they went through.
If the situation came up, I expect you would be put under oath to tell the truth, and questioned. If your beliefs a consider sincere by the hearing officer, you can be a conscientious objector and avoid the draft. The risk you run is that you won’t be believed, but I genuinely doubt a donation to any particular charity will make that much difference. First, there aren’t that many pacifist charities. Second, one could donate to anti-landmine advocacy groups even if one isn’t a pacifist.
I doubt the national head of the US Pacifism League (or its actually existing equivalent) will have any trouble avoiding a draft. Short of that level of commitment to pacifism, there’s not much you can do but thinking about what you would say under oath. Maybe post versions of it publicly in a relevant forum?
Is this really true? Building up a history of pacifism donations during times when war is not looming is hardly a cheap signal. One could easily check a bank account to verify that you didn’t just immediately start donating now that the threat of conscription is actually credible. And if you are a pacifist, then you probably would get significant negative utils from military conscription. So “before the need” is ill-defined. If you place a high value on never being conscripted, then in some sense you “need” to do things to lower that probability.
Elsewhere, you said:
For better or worse, this kind of willingness to do trade-offs in your ordinary life makes it seem more like a personal philosophy (not protected) rather than a duty higher than human relationships (which is protected). Your core concern is projecting sincerity, which is socially expensive.
In my case, because I am sincere, I feel the need to make sure that I seem sincere. I agree that, societally, we often think that a wish to seem sincere implies lack of genuine sincerity. That’s why I would only ask this question in the confines of a place like LessWrong, where other users might more frequently understand that thinking carefully and planning to seem sincere does not necessarily mean that you aren’t actually sincere. As Andrew Gelman likes to say, “Just because it is counterintuitive doesn’t make it true!”
This is precisely why I think it is an interesting problem. If you are a sincere person but you do not believe in “higher than human” duties in the senses that are traditionally used to qualify as a conscientious objector, and you believe you need to do something to better the odds of qualification, what should you do?
The complainer in me wants to also stamp my feet about how unfair it is to be penalized for willingness to do tradeoffs. I don’t like penalizing people for taking a decision seriously and making well-conceived plans.
I’m sympathetic to your problem. Perhaps the only useful advice I’ve given you is that spending money is not perceived as correlating with sincerity in this context. Just about any relevant non-monetary act would be better for your purposes.
Yes. People treat money differently than other things, because with money they understand the fungibility: you make trade-offs all the time, whether to buy this thing or that thing—so it is easy to imagine that any financial decision you did was a similar conscious trade-off.
Other things seem different. On LW we try to understand that they are not so completely different, but for the communication with the non-LW world it is important to remember how they see it.
For example, for a rationalist spending one week creating an anti-war website should be equivalent to spending one week working at some job and paying the money to someone else to create the website. The only thing that matters is the effect of the resulting website. However for most people, spending a week of your time creating the website (unless you are a professional website-maker) signals that you care, while paying someone else does not work this way. (Paying someone else may be a rational decision, but people assume that if you cared, you would prefer to do everything first-hand, even if that would be an irrational decision. This is how people model emotions of others; and this model is rather correct for a non-rationalist.)