(The point of my aside about the Born probabilities is that neither the L^1 norm nor the L^2 norm are privileged. (At least, I don’t understand why our experiments favor one of them over the other.) I could just as easily have talked about the L^3 norm.)
Looking at that Mangled Worlds page, I see that you’re right — Hanson is talking about a finite number of worlds. And as far as I can tell, every world that exists is equally probable, which would correspond to an L^0 norm? I don’t really understand the proposal, though.
Sorry, I guess I got confused about what an L^1 norm meant. My non-confident recollection is that Eliezer believes, not just that we have no idea how to assign measure to worlds, but that our best idea for assigning measure to worlds actively conflicts with the Born rule, except if there exists some sort of mechanism like world-mangling. His endorsement of world-mangling as a possible solution suggests to me that he agrees with its world-counting assumption.
(The point of my aside about the Born probabilities is that neither the L^1 norm nor the L^2 norm are privileged. (At least, I don’t understand why our experiments favor one of them over the other.) I could just as easily have talked about the L^3 norm.)
Looking at that Mangled Worlds page, I see that you’re right — Hanson is talking about a finite number of worlds. And as far as I can tell, every world that exists is equally probable, which would correspond to an L^0 norm? I don’t really understand the proposal, though.
Sorry, I guess I got confused about what an L^1 norm meant. My non-confident recollection is that Eliezer believes, not just that we have no idea how to assign measure to worlds, but that our best idea for assigning measure to worlds actively conflicts with the Born rule, except if there exists some sort of mechanism like world-mangling. His endorsement of world-mangling as a possible solution suggests to me that he agrees with its world-counting assumption.