It is seemingly easy to get stuck in arguments over whether or not machines can “actually” think. It is sufficient to assess the effects or outcomes of the phenomenon in question.
By sidestepping the question of what, exactly, it means to “think”, we can avoid arguing over definitions, yet lose nothing of our ability to model the world.
Does a submarine swim? The purpose of swimming is to propel oneself through the water. A nuclear powered submarine can propel itself through the oceans at full speed for months at a time. It achieves the purpose of swimming, and does so rather better than a fish, or a human.
If the purpose of thinking is isomorphic to:
Model the world in order to formulate plans for executing actions which implement goals.
Then, if a machine can achieve the above we can say it achieves the purpose of thinking, akin to how a submarine successfully achieves the purpose of swimming.
Discussion of whether the machine really thinks is now superfluous.
It is a similar idea as that proposed by Turing. If you have submarines, and they move through the water and do exactly what you want them to do, then it is rather pointless to ask if what they’re doing is “really swimming”. And the arguments on both sides of the “swimming” dispute will make reference to fish.
If the submarine only “swims” when a human tells it to, I think this is the sense intended by saying a submarine doesn’t really swim any more than a scuba tank breathes under water. People “swim” with the aid of a submarine.
Consider in spongebob when plankton builds a fake “Mr Crabs.” The machine is superb, at least as functional as the real Mr Crabs and stronger and more durable to boot. But without a plankton up in the control room running the thing, it does nothing.
Implicit in the ideas of those who think machines may take over is that the increase in capabilities of machines will in some sense naturally, or perhaps even accidentally, include the creation of machine volition, machine will, a machine version of the driver of the machine.
This quoter apparently doubts this assumption, at least about current machines. As long as every powerful machine we build needs a human driver lest it sit there with its metaphorical screen saver on waiting for a volitional agent to command it, then all machines no matter how powerful are just tools.
I don’t think Kurzweil necessarily thinks machines will get volition in his version of the singularity. Kurzweil is much more oriented towards enhanced humans, essentially or eventually a human which can access the solution to provlems that require a lot of intelligence, but who is still supplying all the volition in the system.
Around here, on the other hand, I think it is essentially assumed that machine intelligence will be independent and with its own volition, which humans will have a hand in constraining by design.
The maker of the quote questions whether volition, will, primal drive, will arise naturally as part of the progression
What he’s saying is: submarines traverse water, so it’s irrelevant whether we call what they do “swimming”. Likewise, if a machine can do the things that a thinking being can do, then it’s irrelevant whether it’s “actually” “thinking”.
He refers to this as a settled question in the origin of the quote. Moreover, he capitalizes the terms in question, indicating he perceives the concept as an incorrect reification.
Edsger Dijkstra (1984)
I don’t understand this.
It is seemingly easy to get stuck in arguments over whether or not machines can “actually” think.
It is sufficient to assess the effects or outcomes of the phenomenon in question.
By sidestepping the question of what, exactly, it means to “think”,
we can avoid arguing over definitions, yet lose nothing of our ability to model the world.
Does a submarine swim? The purpose of swimming is to propel oneself through the water. A nuclear powered submarine can propel itself through the oceans at full speed for months at a time. It achieves the purpose of swimming, and does so rather better than a fish, or a human.
If the purpose of thinking is isomorphic to:
Model the world in order to formulate plans for executing actions which implement goals.
Then, if a machine can achieve the above we can say it achieves the purpose of thinking,
akin to how a submarine successfully achieves the purpose of swimming.
Discussion of whether the machine really thinks is now superfluous.
It is a similar idea as that proposed by Turing. If you have submarines, and they move through the water and do exactly what you want them to do, then it is rather pointless to ask if what they’re doing is “really swimming”. And the arguments on both sides of the “swimming” dispute will make reference to fish.
If the submarine only “swims” when a human tells it to, I think this is the sense intended by saying a submarine doesn’t really swim any more than a scuba tank breathes under water. People “swim” with the aid of a submarine.
Consider in spongebob when plankton builds a fake “Mr Crabs.” The machine is superb, at least as functional as the real Mr Crabs and stronger and more durable to boot. But without a plankton up in the control room running the thing, it does nothing.
Implicit in the ideas of those who think machines may take over is that the increase in capabilities of machines will in some sense naturally, or perhaps even accidentally, include the creation of machine volition, machine will, a machine version of the driver of the machine.
This quoter apparently doubts this assumption, at least about current machines. As long as every powerful machine we build needs a human driver lest it sit there with its metaphorical screen saver on waiting for a volitional agent to command it, then all machines no matter how powerful are just tools.
I don’t think Kurzweil necessarily thinks machines will get volition in his version of the singularity. Kurzweil is much more oriented towards enhanced humans, essentially or eventually a human which can access the solution to provlems that require a lot of intelligence, but who is still supplying all the volition in the system.
Around here, on the other hand, I think it is essentially assumed that machine intelligence will be independent and with its own volition, which humans will have a hand in constraining by design.
The maker of the quote questions whether volition, will, primal drive, will arise naturally as part of the progression
I disagree.
What he’s saying is: submarines traverse water, so it’s irrelevant whether we call what they do “swimming”. Likewise, if a machine can do the things that a thinking being can do, then it’s irrelevant whether it’s “actually” “thinking”.
He refers to this as a settled question in the origin of the quote. Moreover, he capitalizes the terms in question, indicating he perceives the concept as an incorrect reification.