Basically, if you want consciousness to matter morally/intrinsically, then you will prefer theories that match your values on what counts as intrinsically valuable, irrespective of the truth of the theory, and in particular, it should be way more surprising than it does that the correct theory of consciousness just so happens to match what you find intrinsically valuable, or at least matches up way more than random chance, because I believe what you value/view as moral is inherently relative, and doesn’t really have a relationship to the scientific problem of consciousness.
I think this is part of the reason why people don’t exactly like reductive conceptions of consciousness, where consciousness is created by parts like neurons/atoms/quantum fields that people usually don’t value in themselves, because they believe that consciousness should come out of parts/units that they think are morally valuable to them, and also part of the reason why people dislike theories that imply that consciousness goes beyond species that they value intrinsically, which is us for most people.
I think every side here is a problem, in that arguments for moral worth of species often are conditionalized on those species being conscious for suffering, and people not wanting to admit that it’s totally fine to be okay with someone suffering, even if they are conscious, and it being totally fine to be okay to value something like a rock, or all rocks, that isn’t conscious or suffering.
Another way to say it is even if a theory suggests that something you don’t value intrinsically is conscious, you don’t have to change your values very much, and you can still go about your day mostly fine.
I think a lot of people who aren’t you conflate moral value with the science question of “what is consciousness” unintentionally, due to the term being so value-loaded.
Basically, if you want consciousness to matter morally/intrinsically, then you will prefer theories that match your values on what counts as intrinsically valuable, irrespective of the truth of the theory, and in particular, it should be way more surprising than it does that the correct theory of consciousness just so happens to match what you find intrinsically valuable, or at least matches up way more than random chance, because I believe what you value/view as moral is inherently relative, and doesn’t really have a relationship to the scientific problem of consciousness.
I think this is part of the reason why people don’t exactly like reductive conceptions of consciousness, where consciousness is created by parts like neurons/atoms/quantum fields that people usually don’t value in themselves, because they believe that consciousness should come out of parts/units that they think are morally valuable to them, and also part of the reason why people dislike theories that imply that consciousness goes beyond species that they value intrinsically, which is us for most people.
I think every side here is a problem, in that arguments for moral worth of species often are conditionalized on those species being conscious for suffering, and people not wanting to admit that it’s totally fine to be okay with someone suffering, even if they are conscious, and it being totally fine to be okay to value something like a rock, or all rocks, that isn’t conscious or suffering.
Another way to say it is even if a theory suggests that something you don’t value intrinsically is conscious, you don’t have to change your values very much, and you can still go about your day mostly fine.
I think a lot of people who aren’t you conflate moral value with the science question of “what is consciousness” unintentionally, due to the term being so value-loaded.