Maybe the first line should be modified to something like “If I later find a diamond in the box...”, or something. How about the following?
I disagree with this modification. The first one explicitly focuses on the causal effect of the belief, but the second one focuses on the temporal successors of the belief. The first is much stronger, more useful, and more general than the second.
Stronger because the second looks like a codification of “post hoc ergo propter hoc,” better because the relationships are narrower, and more general because it responds well to situations where you let causation flow backwards in time. (For example, the first will let you pay in the Parfit’s Hitchhiker scenario.)
I disagree with this modification. The first one explicitly focuses on the causal effect of the belief, but the second one focuses on the temporal successors of the belief. The first is much stronger, more useful, and more general than the second.
I prefer the modification, for some of the same reasons that you disagree with it. That is, because the modification is weaker, less general, actually doesn’t serve to convey shminux’s position and avoids conflating instrumentality considerations with the anti-realist position.
Specifically, saying this:
If I will find no diamond in the box,
I desire to believe that I will find no diamond in the box;
… does not entail any sort of claim about the distribution of the diamond in situations in which one will not happen to, or expect to be able to, personally interact with the diamond but still care whether diamond containing box are sent to some place. ie. It is technically compatible with:
If Sally will find a diamond in the box but I will never receive any message from Sally or the box after the box arrives at Sally,
I still desire to believe that Sally will find a diamond in the box.
(Or, you know, food rations and a terraforming device for her colonization mission.)
I disagree with this modification. The first one explicitly focuses on the causal effect of the belief, but the second one focuses on the temporal successors of the belief. The first is much stronger, more useful, and more general than the second.
Interesting. Do you mind elaborating?
Stronger because the second looks like a codification of “post hoc ergo propter hoc,” better because the relationships are narrower, and more general because it responds well to situations where you let causation flow backwards in time. (For example, the first will let you pay in the Parfit’s Hitchhiker scenario.)
I prefer the modification, for some of the same reasons that you disagree with it. That is, because the modification is weaker, less general, actually doesn’t serve to convey shminux’s position and avoids conflating instrumentality considerations with the anti-realist position.
Specifically, saying this:
… does not entail any sort of claim about the distribution of the diamond in situations in which one will not happen to, or expect to be able to, personally interact with the diamond but still care whether diamond containing box are sent to some place. ie. It is technically compatible with:
(Or, you know, food rations and a terraforming device for her colonization mission.)