Is it just me or is this essentially the same as the Lifespan Dilemma?
At the very least, in both cases, you find that you get high expected utilities by choosing very low probabilities of getting anything at all.
If your preferences can always be modelled with a utility function, does that mean that no matter how you make decisions, there’s some adaptation of this paradox that will lead you to accept a near certainty of death?
It is essentially that, and it does show that trying to maximize expected utility can lead to such negative outcomes. Unfortunately, there doesn’t seem to be a simple alternative to maximizing expected utility that doesn’t lead to being a money pump. The kelly criterion is an excellent example of a decision-making strategy that doesn’t maximize expected utility but still wins compared to it, so at least it’s known that it can be done.
Is it just me or is this essentially the same as the Lifespan Dilemma?
At the very least, in both cases, you find that you get high expected utilities by choosing very low probabilities of getting anything at all.
If your preferences can always be modelled with a utility function, does that mean that no matter how you make decisions, there’s some adaptation of this paradox that will lead you to accept a near certainty of death?
It is essentially that, and it does show that trying to maximize expected utility can lead to such negative outcomes. Unfortunately, there doesn’t seem to be a simple alternative to maximizing expected utility that doesn’t lead to being a money pump. The kelly criterion is an excellent example of a decision-making strategy that doesn’t maximize expected utility but still wins compared to it, so at least it’s known that it can be done.