Why would they become moral patients because other people care about them
Yeah sorry phrased this badly, they would have moral value as in the same way a treasured heirloom has moral value. Second-hand.
The family members do not feel pain about their loved ones. I agree that they suffer, but that is not related to pain stimuli. You can have aversive feelings toward all kinds of things unrelated to nociception. Just think about salty water. You only crave it if you have too little salt, but otherwise it is yuck. Although, maybe, you mean nociception in a non-standard way.
Ahhh I think maybe I know another big reason of why people are confused now. I used nociception in the Gilbert example, but as I mention (probably too fleetingly) in the ‘The Criterion’ part, it is about everything aversive. Aversiveness is where moral value comes from, and it is a subjective sense of aversiveness that first-order systems lack. Nociception is just one thing that typically produces aversiveness.
But I like the self-representation aspect of your criterion and I think it could be fixed by reducing it to just that:
Yes I agree, I will think of a short but maximally precise way of rephrasing it. Thank you.
Yeah sorry phrased this badly, they would have moral value as in the same way a treasured heirloom has moral value. Second-hand.
Ahhh I think maybe I know another big reason of why people are confused now. I used nociception in the Gilbert example, but as I mention (probably too fleetingly) in the ‘The Criterion’ part, it is about everything aversive. Aversiveness is where moral value comes from, and it is a subjective sense of aversiveness that first-order systems lack. Nociception is just one thing that typically produces aversiveness.
Yes I agree, I will think of a short but maximally precise way of rephrasing it. Thank you.