Past this point, we assume following Ajeya Cotra that a strategically aware system which performs well enough to receive perfect human-provided external feedback has probably learned a deceptive human simulating model instead of the intended goal. The later techniques have the potential to address this failure mode. (It is possible that this system would still under-perform on sufficiently superhuman behavioral evaluations)
There are (IMO) plausible threat models in which alignment is very difficult but we don’t need to encounter deceptive alignment. Consider the following scenario:
Our alignment techinques (whatever they are) scale pretty well, as far as we can measure, even up to well-beyond-human-level AGI. However, in the year (say) 2100, the tails come apart. It gradually becomes pretty clear that what we want out powerful AIs to do and what they actually do turns out not to generalize that well outside of the distribution on which we have been testing them so far. At this point, it is to late to roll them back, e.g. because the AIs have become uncorrigible and/or power-seeking. The scenario may also have more systemic character, with AI having already been so tightly integrated into the economy that there is no “undo button”.
This doesn’t assume either the sharp left turn or deceptive alignment, but I’d put it at least at level 8 in your taxonomy.
I’d put the scenario from Karl von Wendt’s novel VIRTUA into this category.
There are (IMO) plausible threat models in which alignment is very difficult but we don’t need to encounter deceptive alignment. Consider the following scenario:
This doesn’t assume either the sharp left turn or deceptive alignment, but I’d put it at least at level 8 in your taxonomy.
I’d put the scenario from Karl von Wendt’s novel VIRTUA into this category.