Yes, once you think about consciousness for some time, you could conclude that there might be some sort of Platonic existence for subjective experience. However, this seems to nullify free will and makes things kind of pointless in the sense that if all moments have already happened, it doesn’t really matter what you do, you are just navigating a space that already exists and will always exist. Intuitively, this doesn’t sound right, and perhaps there is something missing in this picture.
This brings up the vertiginous question. That is, why is THIS moment currently in view, and not another? The trivial answer is that all perspectives somehow “exist” in some Platonic realm. But the reality is that from a subjective point of view, only one particular experience can be in view. So why THIS experience and not another?
Assuming that there is a space of subjective experience, how is it possible to navigate this space such that the present moment is the one that should be in view? In other words, can you establish a metric on the space of subjective experience? What makes one experience different from another? Is it possible to state that one experience is closer or farther from another within this space?
What I can say is that the current moment seems to be “interesting”. From the principle of indifference we should conclude that THIS moment is just a mundane experience from the space of all possible moments, but I am not sure this is correct.
As you allude to I believe this problem is tied to the nature of time itself. After all, without time, all moments are on equal footing. Time seems to lie outside of any mathematical formalism including Tegmark’s MUH in the sense that any formal system is independent of time. The “mechanism” which selects THIS moment must be non-mathematical, or non-algorithmic in nature.
However, this seems to nullify free will and makes things kind of pointless in the sense that if all moments have already happened, it doesn’t really matter what you do, you are just navigating a space that already exists and will always exist. Intuitively, this doesn’t sound right, and perhaps there is something missing in this picture.
Sorry to say, I happen to think free will is an illusion! I have three go-to arguments (in no particular order):
either causes determine effects, or they don’t; if they do, then there’s no “free will”; if they don’t, then what mechanism is there? if it’s random, then there’s no “free will”
the laws of physics are deterministic[1]; why should they have an exception for the human brain?
everything I decide to do depends on the thoughts I have, but I don’t choose when a thought occurs to me; it simply arrives
But the reality is that from a subjective point of view, only one particular experience can be in view. So why THIS experience and not another?
I think this is just a consequence of the nature of the thing. By definition a subjective experience is “private” and “singular”; you can only have one at a time[2]. It’s not that this isn’t a good question; but there’s no way to answer it satisfactorily. We might as well ask “why am I me and not you”![3]
So I would hazard to guess that the time aspect of things is about as trivial — or as mysterious — as the fact that there’s different minds out there (presumably; the jury is still out on that one).
Einstein already told us that there’s no such thing as a global “now”. I think the reason we think there needs to be a now at all is because we’re stuck in time — just as much was we’re stuck in space.
Let’s not bring Schrödinger into this! I am of the opinion that it makes no difference to the argument (and so was Schrödinger himself, if the Wikipedia can be trusted).
I didn’t want to derail this conversation into another free will debate, it wasn’t my main focus, so I will try to be “brief” on responding to your view on free will:
It seems that you subscribe to the “standard model” against free will, that is, either things are determined by external causes, and you have no free will, or they are random, in which that would also constitute the nullification of free will. I am not sure your 3 arguments are actually distinct; they basically point to the same source, namely that “randomness” is not free will, and neither is determinism.
However, this seems like a too simplistic picture, which assumes that people are “point particles” with no internal state. That is, in a deterministic world, the assumption of no free will basically posits that the internal state, however deterministic, cannot be a source of free will. However, I would argue that this is indeed the source of free will, that is the internal state that constitutes “you”. You also state that you do not “choose” which thought occurs to you, it simply arrives. However, I would argue that this is not correct; that is, you are your thoughts, there is nothing else that is “choosing” your thoughts.
Perhaps what you mean is that “your” brain does not choose which thoughts come into view. However, I would argue that “you” are not your brain, but rather the thoughts that constitute your brain, ie. the software layer.
Perhaps a more concrete argument would help here: I claim that learning is impossible without free will. That is, if you cannot choose among a set of actions freely, there is nothing to learn, and thus nothing of value that humanity has ever created would be possible. This is the sense of free will that I am talking about. But perhaps you would argue that everything that humanity has created in a sense was already “determined”. But this determination was the result of a set of agents that collectively exercised their “free will” to generate the fruits of their labor.
In other words, free will is a subjective phenomenon, and only arises from an internal perspective. It is then clear that the “objective” world contains no free will, since by definition, the “objective” world ignores any subjectivity.
Going back to your “standard model” arguments against free will, it seems like the core problem here is the definition of “randomness”. But I would argue that it is in the “randomness” where the free will comes in: that is, when you have a possibility of many different outcomes, and a probability of choosing between any of an “equipotential” of outcomes, this constitutes the source of free will.
Again the word “randomness” is doing most of the work here, which leads to the second point of your comment, namely the connection to time itself and the question of why am I me and not you? You could extend this question to any “random” process, that is, why was this particular outcome “chosen” among a set of outcomes from a probability distribution? Note that this does not have to include the existence of other minds as you have commented previously. Even with a single mind that can make “choices” there is still the question of the non-algorithmic nature of randomness that is elusive, but seems to be a necessary component of the nature of time.
I would also argue that Einstein’s revelation that there is no global “now” actually has been understated substantially. That is, if there is no global “now” then what determines which “now” is in view? With a unified time picture, there is no question here: all persons experience the same now and thus everyone in a sense “exists” at the same “time”. This perhaps more than anything else that Einstein worked on highlights the essence of time itself and its non-algorithmic nature.
Yes, once you think about consciousness for some time, you could conclude that there might be some sort of Platonic existence for subjective experience. However, this seems to nullify free will and makes things kind of pointless in the sense that if all moments have already happened, it doesn’t really matter what you do, you are just navigating a space that already exists and will always exist. Intuitively, this doesn’t sound right, and perhaps there is something missing in this picture.
This brings up the vertiginous question. That is, why is THIS moment currently in view, and not another? The trivial answer is that all perspectives somehow “exist” in some Platonic realm. But the reality is that from a subjective point of view, only one particular experience can be in view. So why THIS experience and not another?
Assuming that there is a space of subjective experience, how is it possible to navigate this space such that the present moment is the one that should be in view? In other words, can you establish a metric on the space of subjective experience? What makes one experience different from another? Is it possible to state that one experience is closer or farther from another within this space?
What I can say is that the current moment seems to be “interesting”. From the principle of indifference we should conclude that THIS moment is just a mundane experience from the space of all possible moments, but I am not sure this is correct.
As you allude to I believe this problem is tied to the nature of time itself. After all, without time, all moments are on equal footing. Time seems to lie outside of any mathematical formalism including Tegmark’s MUH in the sense that any formal system is independent of time. The “mechanism” which selects THIS moment must be non-mathematical, or non-algorithmic in nature.
We seem to be living in interesting times indeed.
Thanks for your comment!
Sorry to say, I happen to think free will is an illusion! I have three go-to arguments (in no particular order):
either causes determine effects, or they don’t; if they do, then there’s no “free will”; if they don’t, then what mechanism is there? if it’s random, then there’s no “free will”
the laws of physics are deterministic[1]; why should they have an exception for the human brain?
everything I decide to do depends on the thoughts I have, but I don’t choose when a thought occurs to me; it simply arrives
I think this is just a consequence of the nature of the thing. By definition a subjective experience is “private” and “singular”; you can only have one at a time[2]. It’s not that this isn’t a good question; but there’s no way to answer it satisfactorily. We might as well ask “why am I me and not you”![3]
So I would hazard to guess that the time aspect of things is about as trivial — or as mysterious — as the fact that there’s different minds out there (presumably; the jury is still out on that one).
Einstein already told us that there’s no such thing as a global “now”. I think the reason we think there needs to be a now at all is because we’re stuck in time — just as much was we’re stuck in space.
Let’s not bring Schrödinger into this! I am of the opinion that it makes no difference to the argument (and so was Schrödinger himself, if the Wikipedia can be trusted).
I mean, we could get really kooky and think of trog-like subjective experiences, but that’s blowing up the scope of what I’m trying to discuss.
Which I asked my parents at the age of 5! They did not understand.
I didn’t want to derail this conversation into another free will debate, it wasn’t my main focus, so I will try to be “brief” on responding to your view on free will:
It seems that you subscribe to the “standard model” against free will, that is, either things are determined by external causes, and you have no free will, or they are random, in which that would also constitute the nullification of free will. I am not sure your 3 arguments are actually distinct; they basically point to the same source, namely that “randomness” is not free will, and neither is determinism.
However, this seems like a too simplistic picture, which assumes that people are “point particles” with no internal state. That is, in a deterministic world, the assumption of no free will basically posits that the internal state, however deterministic, cannot be a source of free will. However, I would argue that this is indeed the source of free will, that is the internal state that constitutes “you”. You also state that you do not “choose” which thought occurs to you, it simply arrives. However, I would argue that this is not correct; that is, you are your thoughts, there is nothing else that is “choosing” your thoughts.
Perhaps what you mean is that “your” brain does not choose which thoughts come into view. However, I would argue that “you” are not your brain, but rather the thoughts that constitute your brain, ie. the software layer.
Perhaps a more concrete argument would help here: I claim that learning is impossible without free will. That is, if you cannot choose among a set of actions freely, there is nothing to learn, and thus nothing of value that humanity has ever created would be possible. This is the sense of free will that I am talking about. But perhaps you would argue that everything that humanity has created in a sense was already “determined”. But this determination was the result of a set of agents that collectively exercised their “free will” to generate the fruits of their labor.
In other words, free will is a subjective phenomenon, and only arises from an internal perspective. It is then clear that the “objective” world contains no free will, since by definition, the “objective” world ignores any subjectivity.
Going back to your “standard model” arguments against free will, it seems like the core problem here is the definition of “randomness”. But I would argue that it is in the “randomness” where the free will comes in: that is, when you have a possibility of many different outcomes, and a probability of choosing between any of an “equipotential” of outcomes, this constitutes the source of free will.
Again the word “randomness” is doing most of the work here, which leads to the second point of your comment, namely the connection to time itself and the question of why am I me and not you? You could extend this question to any “random” process, that is, why was this particular outcome “chosen” among a set of outcomes from a probability distribution? Note that this does not have to include the existence of other minds as you have commented previously. Even with a single mind that can make “choices” there is still the question of the non-algorithmic nature of randomness that is elusive, but seems to be a necessary component of the nature of time.
I would also argue that Einstein’s revelation that there is no global “now” actually has been understated substantially. That is, if there is no global “now” then what determines which “now” is in view? With a unified time picture, there is no question here: all persons experience the same now and thus everyone in a sense “exists” at the same “time”. This perhaps more than anything else that Einstein worked on highlights the essence of time itself and its non-algorithmic nature.