When you make a decision that results in fewer people living than might have lived, Phil Goetz calls that “killing a person”. If you are an aid recipient, then giving up your aid and your life to save another person will not change the number of people who live, so it doesn’t count as “killing a person”.
If, however, you have the means to save two people with the aid you’re receiving, then you’re “killing a person” by not sacrificing your life—assuming your life counts as much as anyone else’s.
I suppose another point to add is that “aid” is worth “one life.” The actual specific life doesn’t matter as long as one life is being redeemed with the aid.
If you do this, than the value of aid could be forecasted to include scenarios where the cost of aid decreases or the amount available to spend on aid increases. It would be okay to spend $10 to get $20 and then turn it into 2 lives saved. So, the question becomes 1 life now, 2 lives later.
Okay, yeah, this makes it work. The trick is valuing $10 at one life. If you are getting less than one life for $10 than you are getting robbed. Or, more accurately, you are saying that whatever you did get for $10 is worth the same as a life.
$10 is just a number. We could put in $X.
So… does this mean anything? If 1 life is $X and a random material thing costs $X, than of course they cost the same. By definition, they have the same dollar value.
Does the question become how much moral value can you get per dollar value? In that case, the best moral value per dollar is spending all of your dollars on lives saved. This throws us back into the field of value systems, but in a way that makes sense.
Okay, so does this actually answer my original question?
I never understood how this morality worked. The problem I see with this view is that you are double counting the value of money.
You work an hour and get $10, but the employer just killed $10 worth of people by hiring you instead of sending it for aid
You buy a latte and just killed $10 worth of people by hiring you instead of sending it for aid
LatteShop pays LatteBoy $10 for an hour of work and just killed $10 worth of people by hiring him instead of sending it for aid
The $10 doesn’t leave the system and everyone who touches it just killed a whole slew of people because they sent it somewhere other than aid. Why are you carrying the moral burden?
It answers the question by saying, since $10 can be spent to save 1 life but you are instead spending the money on a latte, you value a latte as much as you value 1 life. But this is a tautology. The next step is saying, “Therefore, you are killing someone by not saving them and buying a latte instead.”
The implication could be that if X equals Y in one value system than X equals Y in all value systems. But this is obviously false.
The implication could be that you should spend all dollars in a way that maximizes moral value. Or, more accurately, it is more moral to trade dollars for higher moral value. The inverse would be that it is less moral to trade dollars for lower moral value.
I can see the jump from this to the statement, “[E]very time you get your hair cut, or go to a movie, or drink a Starbucks latte, you’re killing someone.”
The reason my initial criticism actually fails is because a latte costs $10 and the time it takes to earn $10. By the time I get another $10, someone dies.
The next person who touches the $10 has the same moral weight because time is ticking away. This is why we have the question of asking if 1 life now is better than 2 lives later. If the particular 1 life now was included in the 2 lives later the answer would be trivial. The actual question is, 1 life now, or 2 lives and 1 death later.
So the specific answer to my question:
$10 can be translated into time.
I can earn $10 with one hour-value.
The moral value of a life will expire in one hour.
$10 can save a life or buy a latte.
So, with one hour-value I can save a life or buy a latte.
If I don’t save the life, it will expire.
The next person to touch the $10 doesn’t matter because the real value being spent behind the scenes is the hour-value.
Tada! There was an answer.
And it was so close to something Dustin said. If only he had said “one hour” instead of “nothing.”
When you make a decision that results in fewer people living than might have lived, Phil Goetz calls that “killing a person”. If you are an aid recipient, then giving up your aid and your life to save another person will not change the number of people who live, so it doesn’t count as “killing a person”.
If, however, you have the means to save two people with the aid you’re receiving, then you’re “killing a person” by not sacrificing your life—assuming your life counts as much as anyone else’s.
I suppose another point to add is that “aid” is worth “one life.” The actual specific life doesn’t matter as long as one life is being redeemed with the aid.
If you do this, than the value of aid could be forecasted to include scenarios where the cost of aid decreases or the amount available to spend on aid increases. It would be okay to spend $10 to get $20 and then turn it into 2 lives saved. So, the question becomes 1 life now, 2 lives later.
Okay, yeah, this makes it work. The trick is valuing $10 at one life. If you are getting less than one life for $10 than you are getting robbed. Or, more accurately, you are saying that whatever you did get for $10 is worth the same as a life.
$10 is just a number. We could put in $X.
So… does this mean anything? If 1 life is $X and a random material thing costs $X, than of course they cost the same. By definition, they have the same dollar value.
Does the question become how much moral value can you get per dollar value? In that case, the best moral value per dollar is spending all of your dollars on lives saved. This throws us back into the field of value systems, but in a way that makes sense.
Okay, so does this actually answer my original question?
It answers the question by saying, since $10 can be spent to save 1 life but you are instead spending the money on a latte, you value a latte as much as you value 1 life. But this is a tautology. The next step is saying, “Therefore, you are killing someone by not saving them and buying a latte instead.”
The implication could be that if X equals Y in one value system than X equals Y in all value systems. But this is obviously false.
The implication could be that you should spend all dollars in a way that maximizes moral value. Or, more accurately, it is more moral to trade dollars for higher moral value. The inverse would be that it is less moral to trade dollars for lower moral value.
I can see the jump from this to the statement, “[E]very time you get your hair cut, or go to a movie, or drink a Starbucks latte, you’re killing someone.”
The reason my initial criticism actually fails is because a latte costs $10 and the time it takes to earn $10. By the time I get another $10, someone dies.
The next person who touches the $10 has the same moral weight because time is ticking away. This is why we have the question of asking if 1 life now is better than 2 lives later. If the particular 1 life now was included in the 2 lives later the answer would be trivial. The actual question is, 1 life now, or 2 lives and 1 death later.
So the specific answer to my question:
$10 can be translated into time.
I can earn $10 with one hour-value.
The moral value of a life will expire in one hour.
$10 can save a life or buy a latte.
So, with one hour-value I can save a life or buy a latte.
If I don’t save the life, it will expire.
The next person to touch the $10 doesn’t matter because the real value being spent behind the scenes is the hour-value.
Tada! There was an answer.
And it was so close to something Dustin said. If only he had said “one hour” instead of “nothing.”