We don’t all care about exactly the same things; we may have, as some philosopher has doubtless put it, different “moral tastes”. But these tastes probably vary continuously, and there’s bound to be enough overlap to make effective cooperation possible.
There probably isn’t anybody else here who cares about the Knox case to quite the same extent that I do; but there are a fair number who care about it enough to have had a discussion about it. And I expect that even those (such as yourself) who don’t care about it at all would prefer, all else being equal, to live in a world where such things did not happen—so, I’m guessing, they (you) don’t really mind too much if others do care. A situation like this allows effective, cooperative moral action: I write a post, others discuss it, and still others allow said discussion to coexist in the same space where they discuss what they care about. Hopefully, some net benefit to the world is achieved. (Then, later, the roles switch, and the favors are reciprocated, resulting in some other, different benefit.)
I would like to raise the possibility that what’s really going on here is not that you’ve made a decision to dilute all of your caring, but rather that you don’t care about the exact same things that I do: a simple difference of personality. While I am hardly able to stop thinking about the Knox case, you are inclined to expend your psychological resources elsewhere (whether on other “moral causes”, or other activities in general). So long as we are able to cooperate effectively and avoid negative-sum conflicts, this may not pose any serious problem.
I have, I think, a rather unusual psychological makeup. For some reason, I am susceptible to being moved by the plight of someone like Amanda Knox, to whom I don’t have any known personal connection, to a greater degree than most people. But I don’t particularly dislike this fact about myself. In fact, I think it’s quite nice that there are a certain number of people like this out there, so that someone like Amanda doesn’t have to rely only on those close to her to champion her cause. If it were me in that situation, I would certainly hope that some people other than friends and relatives would care.
Being this way doesn’t interfere with my ability to shut up and multiply; indeed, I have already mentioned, in the discussion that you linked to, how it helps me to care more about humanity’s problems in general than I otherwise would. So I actually think it’s a pretty good way to be. But if others are differently constituted, or just have different particular interests, let us divide up the moral labor and cooperate to the extent possible.
Shut up? Maybe not. Divide? Yes: divide labor.
We don’t all care about exactly the same things; we may have, as some philosopher has doubtless put it, different “moral tastes”. But these tastes probably vary continuously, and there’s bound to be enough overlap to make effective cooperation possible.
There probably isn’t anybody else here who cares about the Knox case to quite the same extent that I do; but there are a fair number who care about it enough to have had a discussion about it. And I expect that even those (such as yourself) who don’t care about it at all would prefer, all else being equal, to live in a world where such things did not happen—so, I’m guessing, they (you) don’t really mind too much if others do care. A situation like this allows effective, cooperative moral action: I write a post, others discuss it, and still others allow said discussion to coexist in the same space where they discuss what they care about. Hopefully, some net benefit to the world is achieved. (Then, later, the roles switch, and the favors are reciprocated, resulting in some other, different benefit.)
I would like to raise the possibility that what’s really going on here is not that you’ve made a decision to dilute all of your caring, but rather that you don’t care about the exact same things that I do: a simple difference of personality. While I am hardly able to stop thinking about the Knox case, you are inclined to expend your psychological resources elsewhere (whether on other “moral causes”, or other activities in general). So long as we are able to cooperate effectively and avoid negative-sum conflicts, this may not pose any serious problem.
I have, I think, a rather unusual psychological makeup. For some reason, I am susceptible to being moved by the plight of someone like Amanda Knox, to whom I don’t have any known personal connection, to a greater degree than most people. But I don’t particularly dislike this fact about myself. In fact, I think it’s quite nice that there are a certain number of people like this out there, so that someone like Amanda doesn’t have to rely only on those close to her to champion her cause. If it were me in that situation, I would certainly hope that some people other than friends and relatives would care.
Being this way doesn’t interfere with my ability to shut up and multiply; indeed, I have already mentioned, in the discussion that you linked to, how it helps me to care more about humanity’s problems in general than I otherwise would. So I actually think it’s a pretty good way to be. But if others are differently constituted, or just have different particular interests, let us divide up the moral labor and cooperate to the extent possible.