Well, yes, but it’s really hard to get away from the need to observe reality if we care about the difference between truths and compelling falsehoods.
Sure, among people with some level of trust or shared theoretical background it’s fine to have proxies for direct observation (like trustworthy reports of observations, or careful speculation grounded in previously accepted theory, or even analogies to other systems generally understood to be similar). Which is, as you say, convenient.
But those proxies tend to break down when talking to “outsiders,” which seemed to be the context. (Though as I said initially, I was not 100% sure of the context.) If an evolutionary biologist tells me that recent genome research shows a particular fact about the evolutionary history of primates, I will have a lot of confidence in that fact, but if I’m talking to a creationist that will cut no ice.
That said: those proxies are also easily abused by “insiders” to promote beliefs that just ain’t so, which is one reason periodically talking to “outsiders” is valuable even if one isn’t convincing them of anything.
It’s also why I prefer to avoid conversations that are just about showing other people that they’re wrong and I’m right. (Which is not to say I always succeed in avoiding them.)
Admittedly, there’s always the option of giving up on demonstrating the benefits of rationality and instead relying on rhetorical techniques for convincing people they ought to be rational. It’s best to use that approach only when I’m “certain” that I’m correct, though.
Well, yes, but it’s really hard to get away from the need to observe reality if we care about the difference between truths and compelling falsehoods.
Sure, among people with some level of trust or shared theoretical background it’s fine to have proxies for direct observation (like trustworthy reports of observations, or careful speculation grounded in previously accepted theory, or even analogies to other systems generally understood to be similar). Which is, as you say, convenient.
But those proxies tend to break down when talking to “outsiders,” which seemed to be the context. (Though as I said initially, I was not 100% sure of the context.) If an evolutionary biologist tells me that recent genome research shows a particular fact about the evolutionary history of primates, I will have a lot of confidence in that fact, but if I’m talking to a creationist that will cut no ice.
That said: those proxies are also easily abused by “insiders” to promote beliefs that just ain’t so, which is one reason periodically talking to “outsiders” is valuable even if one isn’t convincing them of anything.
It’s also why I prefer to avoid conversations that are just about showing other people that they’re wrong and I’m right. (Which is not to say I always succeed in avoiding them.)
Admittedly, there’s always the option of giving up on demonstrating the benefits of rationality and instead relying on rhetorical techniques for convincing people they ought to be rational. It’s best to use that approach only when I’m “certain” that I’m correct, though.