I just noticed this post, by sheer chance, and am now aghast that I overlooked it earlier; it is excellent, and well worth reading.
The practical definition of “authority” or “authoritative information” that Waldman gives seems to me to be very useful. The linked post gives enough examples, so I’d like to put forth a question that occurred to me as I read, and which I was slightly surprised the post doesn’t address:
What happens when authority conflicts? Or, to be precise: under what circumstances does it come to be the case, that we (as individuals, as organizations, etc.) are in possession of two (or more) sets of authoritative information, but find it impossible to behave as if both of these sets of information are true?
Do such circumstances occur because of factional conflicts? Because of insufficient coordination on the part of the authorities? For some other reason?
Are they noticed when they occur, or are they resolved without being noticed?
How are they resolved? “Top-down” resolution (with one authority explicitly or implicitly overruling the other)? In that case, does other authoritative information from the losing authority become less authoritative? Or “bottom up”, with individuals selecting (and by what means?) behavior from among the possible options that satisfy at least some of the sets of the authoritative information they have? And likewise, do the sources of some of this information become less authoritative as a result?
Are there any cases in which such conflicts (i.e., practical incompatibilities of sets of authoritative information) are advantageous to some or all of the authorities involved?
I just noticed this post, by sheer chance, and am now aghast that I overlooked it earlier; it is excellent, and well worth reading.
The practical definition of “authority” or “authoritative information” that Waldman gives seems to me to be very useful. The linked post gives enough examples, so I’d like to put forth a question that occurred to me as I read, and which I was slightly surprised the post doesn’t address:
What happens when authority conflicts? Or, to be precise: under what circumstances does it come to be the case, that we (as individuals, as organizations, etc.) are in possession of two (or more) sets of authoritative information, but find it impossible to behave as if both of these sets of information are true?
Do such circumstances occur because of factional conflicts? Because of insufficient coordination on the part of the authorities? For some other reason?
Are they noticed when they occur, or are they resolved without being noticed?
How are they resolved? “Top-down” resolution (with one authority explicitly or implicitly overruling the other)? In that case, does other authoritative information from the losing authority become less authoritative? Or “bottom up”, with individuals selecting (and by what means?) behavior from among the possible options that satisfy at least some of the sets of the authoritative information they have? And likewise, do the sources of some of this information become less authoritative as a result?
Are there any cases in which such conflicts (i.e., practical incompatibilities of sets of authoritative information) are advantageous to some or all of the authorities involved?