Thanks David and Ege for these excellent points! You’re giving me too much credit by calling it a “thesis”; it was simply part of my reasoning behind the 30% number. Yeah, I did consider the Gulf War as an important counterexample. I’ll definitely consider revising my 30% number downward in my next update, but there are also interesting examples on the other side:
The Falklands War: The Argentinian military junta’s 1982 invasion of the British Falkland Islands was humiliatingly defeated. This became the final nail in the coffin for a dictatorship facing a collapsing economy and increasing domestic resistance, and collapsed shortly thereafter. Most of the members of the Junta are currently in prison for crimes against humanity and genocide.
The Yom Kippur War: The 1973 invasion of Israeli-held territory by an Arab coalition was unsuccessful. Although the Arab national leaders were able to remain in power, some military leaders fared less well. Syrian Colonel Rafik Halawi, who’s infantry brigade allowed an Israeli breakthrough, was executed before the war even ended.
Survival of nation versus leader: Although mainstream Western media often portrays Putin as the main driving force behind the invasion, there’s also broad and well-documented local sentiment that the West has been seeking to weaken, fragment and dominate Russia for decades, with Ukraine being a red line. Whether such sentiment is valid or not is irrelevant for my argument. In other words, the “escalate-or-die” dynamic may be playing out not only in Putin’s head, but also at a national level. Ukraine itself is a shining example of how powerful such national self-preservation instincts can be.
I agree with the Falklands War being a good example of your thesis; I forgot about it while making my list. No arguments there.
I did consider the Yom Kippur War, but I noticed as you did that the national leaders didn’t lose power and it was not clear to me whether we should say the Arab forces were defeated in the war. It seems like Egypt achieved at least some limited objectives as a result of the war, even if it fell far short of what they might have wanted to achieve. So I’m not sure if we should consider this as a “successful trial” in the reference class or not.
I think this is directionally correct but I’m not sure what the magnitude of the update we should make on this would be. It doesn’t seem like a very strong argument, in the sense that I expect arguments of similar strength to exist even if the conclusion is wrong.
I think if you had said that Putin would have a 20% chance of being thrown out of office as a result of agreeing to a return to the status quo ante bellum, I would agree with you. You said it’s “almost certain”, though, which seems way too strong to me. It’s not at all unreasonable for Putin to back down and take a 20% risk of being removed from power instead of going to nuclear war.
My estimate is that if Putin tried to launch a nuclear war against NATO, he would actually run a risk of being removed that’s significantly greater than 20%; maybe on the order of 50%. If his calculation is similar, it would be more reasonable for him to take the loss and hope he can turn it into a propaganda victory.
But Ukraine is not a part of NATO, nor does it exist under its nuclear umbrella. So Putin won’t be starting a nuclear war with NATO, and if he did go ahead with tactical nukes in Ukraine, NATO (while maintaining strategic ambiguity regarding its response) maintains its response will be “destructive” but “conventional”. Legally speaking, NATO is not bound to retaliate against Putin in the event of such a strike. It will likely do so out of self-preservation interest.
Another important point to remember about Putin being able to hold on to his seat is the company of countries he rans with and depends on. Conceding defeat also imperils his position in the Arab world (note the bold OPEC+ move Russia lobbied hard for) and with key BRICS countries like China and India, who are already circling former Soviet realms of influence in Central Asia. Putin, and Russia, have a lot to lose, and no one likes a defeated ally unless they sell energy at unsustainable discounts indefinitely. Even if Russians don’t come after Putin themselves (which sounds unlikely to me), other countries could opt to install a more favorable ruler to protect and advance their (energy) interests. This is a method long favored by colonial empires, especially in (natural) resource rich countries.
But Ukraine is not a part of NATO, nor does it exist under its nuclear umbrella. So Putin won’t be starting a nuclear war with NATO, and if he did, NATO (while maintaining strategic ambiguity regarding its response) maintains its response will be “destructive” but “conventional”. Legally speaking, NATO is not bound to retaliate against Putin in the event of such a strike. It will likely do so out of self-preservation interest.
Yes, but then the above argument undercuts the 70% transition probability from a conventional NATO response to Russian nuclear use in Ukraine to a global nuclear war between NATO and Russia. I also do think that Putin would be reluctant to open Pandora’s box in this situation by unilateral use of nuclear weapons—I think saying Putin accepting Vietnam without nuclear use in Ukraine being < 10% likely is wrong.
Another important point to remember about Putin being able to hold on to his seat is the company of countries he rans with and depends on. Conceding defeat also imperils his position in the Arab world (note the bold OPEC+ move Russia lobbied hard for) and with key BRICS countries like China and India, who are already circling former Soviet realms of influence in Central Asia. Putin, and Russia, have a lot to lose, and no one likes a defeated ally unless they sell energy at unsustainable discounts indefinitely. Even if Russians don’t come after Putin themselves (which sounds unlikely to me), other countries could opt to install a more favorable ruler to protect and advance their (energy) interests. This is a method long favored by colonial empires, especially in (natural) resource rich countries.
I don’t find any of these arguments persuasive. As I’ve said, I would expect arguments this strong to exist even if the conclusion you’re arguing for is wrong, so seeing them doesn’t give me any cause for a belief update.
Another example of a dictator driven from power by losing a war is the Greek Junta. They instigated a coup in Cyprus, triggering an invasion by Turkey, and then lost power at home.
But Bruce Bueno de Mosquita claims that dictators are much better at cutting their losses and surviving, whereas democracies double down and escalate to total war.
Thanks David and Ege for these excellent points! You’re giving me too much credit by calling it a “thesis”; it was simply part of my reasoning behind the 30% number. Yeah, I did consider the Gulf War as an important counterexample. I’ll definitely consider revising my 30% number downward in my next update, but there are also interesting examples on the other side:
The Falklands War: The Argentinian military junta’s 1982 invasion of the British Falkland Islands was humiliatingly defeated. This became the final nail in the coffin for a dictatorship facing a collapsing economy and increasing domestic resistance, and collapsed shortly thereafter. Most of the members of the Junta are currently in prison for crimes against humanity and genocide.
The Yom Kippur War: The 1973 invasion of Israeli-held territory by an Arab coalition was unsuccessful. Although the Arab national leaders were able to remain in power, some military leaders fared less well. Syrian Colonel Rafik Halawi, who’s infantry brigade allowed an Israeli breakthrough, was executed before the war even ended.
Survival of nation versus leader: Although mainstream Western media often portrays Putin as the main driving force behind the invasion, there’s also broad and well-documented local sentiment that the West has been seeking to weaken, fragment and dominate Russia for decades, with Ukraine being a red line. Whether such sentiment is valid or not is irrelevant for my argument. In other words, the “escalate-or-die” dynamic may be playing out not only in Putin’s head, but also at a national level. Ukraine itself is a shining example of how powerful such national self-preservation instincts can be.
Responding to your examples:
I agree with the Falklands War being a good example of your thesis; I forgot about it while making my list. No arguments there.
I did consider the Yom Kippur War, but I noticed as you did that the national leaders didn’t lose power and it was not clear to me whether we should say the Arab forces were defeated in the war. It seems like Egypt achieved at least some limited objectives as a result of the war, even if it fell far short of what they might have wanted to achieve. So I’m not sure if we should consider this as a “successful trial” in the reference class or not.
I think this is directionally correct but I’m not sure what the magnitude of the update we should make on this would be. It doesn’t seem like a very strong argument, in the sense that I expect arguments of similar strength to exist even if the conclusion is wrong.
I think if you had said that Putin would have a 20% chance of being thrown out of office as a result of agreeing to a return to the status quo ante bellum, I would agree with you. You said it’s “almost certain”, though, which seems way too strong to me. It’s not at all unreasonable for Putin to back down and take a 20% risk of being removed from power instead of going to nuclear war.
My estimate is that if Putin tried to launch a nuclear war against NATO, he would actually run a risk of being removed that’s significantly greater than 20%; maybe on the order of 50%. If his calculation is similar, it would be more reasonable for him to take the loss and hope he can turn it into a propaganda victory.
But Ukraine is not a part of NATO, nor does it exist under its nuclear umbrella. So Putin won’t be starting a nuclear war with NATO, and if he did go ahead with tactical nukes in Ukraine, NATO (while maintaining strategic ambiguity regarding its response) maintains its response will be “destructive” but “conventional”. Legally speaking, NATO is not bound to retaliate against Putin in the event of such a strike. It will likely do so out of self-preservation interest.
Another important point to remember about Putin being able to hold on to his seat is the company of countries he rans with and depends on. Conceding defeat also imperils his position in the Arab world (note the bold OPEC+ move Russia lobbied hard for) and with key BRICS countries like China and India, who are already circling former Soviet realms of influence in Central Asia. Putin, and Russia, have a lot to lose, and no one likes a defeated ally unless they sell energy at unsustainable discounts indefinitely. Even if Russians don’t come after Putin themselves (which sounds unlikely to me), other countries could opt to install a more favorable ruler to protect and advance their (energy) interests. This is a method long favored by colonial empires, especially in (natural) resource rich countries.
Yes, but then the above argument undercuts the 70% transition probability from a conventional NATO response to Russian nuclear use in Ukraine to a global nuclear war between NATO and Russia. I also do think that Putin would be reluctant to open Pandora’s box in this situation by unilateral use of nuclear weapons—I think saying Putin accepting Vietnam without nuclear use in Ukraine being < 10% likely is wrong.
I don’t find any of these arguments persuasive. As I’ve said, I would expect arguments this strong to exist even if the conclusion you’re arguing for is wrong, so seeing them doesn’t give me any cause for a belief update.
Another example of a dictator driven from power by losing a war is the Greek Junta. They instigated a coup in Cyprus, triggering an invasion by Turkey, and then lost power at home.
But Bruce Bueno de Mosquita claims that dictators are much better at cutting their losses and surviving, whereas democracies double down and escalate to total war.