When new discoveries (particularly in physics) question the underlying assumptions, or where the method seems inadequate for solving the problem, then it turns out to be rather useful that there are some philosophers still thinking about these things.
Thomas Kuhn agrees with you:
It is, I think, particularly in periods of acknowledged crisis that scientists have turned to philosophical analysis as a device for unlocking the riddles of their field. Scientists have not generally needed or wanted to be philosophers.
I notice that Kuhn does not say that the scientists turn to philosophers. So are they really “turning to philosophical analysis”? Or are they just, because they must examine more basic assumptions that they usually need to, perforce turning to thinking at the level where the disagreements can be resolved? In the process, what they are doing may look like what philosophers do, but they eventually settle on an answer and move on. Philosophy never seems to do that.
Thomas Kuhn agrees with you:
from “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”
I notice that Kuhn does not say that the scientists turn to philosophers. So are they really “turning to philosophical analysis”? Or are they just, because they must examine more basic assumptions that they usually need to, perforce turning to thinking at the level where the disagreements can be resolved? In the process, what they are doing may look like what philosophers do, but they eventually settle on an answer and move on. Philosophy never seems to do that.