We can make an outside-view argument that we ought to choose A even if we are 99% sure that it provides no benefit, as we get “identical copy immortality” for free.
That said, let’s consider the inside view. I find the idea of 100 copies gaining 100 times as much experience very intuitive. You may ask, how can we prove this? Well, we can’t, but we can’t prove that anyone else feels anything at all either. Accepting that other people feel qualia, but denying that copies feel qualia on the basis that there’s no empirical proof feels like an isolated demand for rigour.
We can make an outside-view argument that we ought to choose A even if we are 99% sure that it provides no benefit, as we get “identical copy immortality” for free.
That said, let’s consider the inside view. I find the idea of 100 copies gaining 100 times as much experience very intuitive. You may ask, how can we prove this? Well, we can’t, but we can’t prove that anyone else feels anything at all either. Accepting that other people feel qualia, but denying that copies feel qualia on the basis that there’s no empirical proof feels like an isolated demand for rigour.