Hey, the real Omega is supposed to not be lying, right? If I were to doubt that, given the extremely low prior of Omega submitting me to this test (compared to a fellow human trying to con me), then the math would probably tell me that the lottery has better odds.
As Stuart_Armstrong noted, this poll was intended to be about precommitment. Now, provided you had not had a chance to precommit (assume that Omega is not known for reading LW, or running it), would you pay in a sudden one-shot experiment? [pollid:185]
I think pre-commitment is irrelevant if you assume Omega can actually read your decision algorithm and predict it deterministically. You want to be the type of person that would give Omega $1k if the fair coin toss didn’t go your way; if you’re not that type of person once the coin has been tossed, it’s too late; and not being that type of person is only a good thing if it wasn’t actually a fair coin.
Please provide an example or a link to a somewhat realistic situation where this approach (distinguishing between actual and counterfactual precommitment) loses money.
It’s an interesting account indeed, but hardly relevant to the point in hand, which is “you are guaranteed to lose this time if you precommit counterfactually, but should do it anyway”.
You’re guaranteed to lose if you precommit to giving Omega $1k, if this scenario ever comes up, yes.
However, a precommitment to giving Omega $1k if you lose, and gaining $1M if you win, has positive expected value, and it necessarily entails the precommitment to giving Omega $1k if you lose the coin toss. If you just precommit to giving Omega $1k (and also to refusing the $1M if he ever offers it), then yeah; that’s pretty dumb.
I suppose you want to measure if people here think having the chance to pre-commit changes the correct answer? Thinking it does is not reflectively consistent, right? Could there be that reflective consistency isn’t that important after all?
(Re)Poll time: would you give Omega $100? [pollid:184]
Incidentally, if you vote yes on this, don’t vote anonymously! You want to proclaim your decision to any partial Omega’s out there...
Hey, the real Omega is supposed to not be lying, right? If I were to doubt that, given the extremely low prior of Omega submitting me to this test (compared to a fellow human trying to con me), then the math would probably tell me that the lottery has better odds.
As Stuart_Armstrong noted, this poll was intended to be about precommitment. Now, provided you had not had a chance to precommit (assume that Omega is not known for reading LW, or running it), would you pay in a sudden one-shot experiment? [pollid:185]
I think pre-commitment is irrelevant if you assume Omega can actually read your decision algorithm and predict it deterministically. You want to be the type of person that would give Omega $1k if the fair coin toss didn’t go your way; if you’re not that type of person once the coin has been tossed, it’s too late; and not being that type of person is only a good thing if it wasn’t actually a fair coin.
What if I’m the type of person who does not honor counterfactual precommitment, only actual one?
Then expect to lose :-)
Lose what?
Lose money, at least in expectation, if ever these issues come up!
Please provide an example or a link to a somewhat realistic situation where this approach (distinguishing between actual and counterfactual precommitment) loses money.
Oh, you are being difficult, aren’t you! :-P
Well, there is this interesting claim:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/1zw/newcombs_problem_happened_to_me/
It’s an interesting account indeed, but hardly relevant to the point in hand, which is “you are guaranteed to lose this time if you precommit counterfactually, but should do it anyway”.
You’re guaranteed to lose if you precommit to giving Omega $1k, if this scenario ever comes up, yes.
However, a precommitment to giving Omega $1k if you lose, and gaining $1M if you win, has positive expected value, and it necessarily entails the precommitment to giving Omega $1k if you lose the coin toss. If you just precommit to giving Omega $1k (and also to refusing the $1M if he ever offers it), then yeah; that’s pretty dumb.
Well, I’m more in favour of “you should now precommit to everything of this type that could happen in the future”.
I precommit to precommit on all future setups with expected positive payoff except for unannounced setups where I am told that I have already lost.
What about unannounced setups where you are told that you have already lost—but where you would have had a chance of winning big, had you said yes?
Again, a realistic example of where such a situation occurs would help me understand your point.
I suppose you want to measure if people here think having the chance to pre-commit changes the correct answer? Thinking it does is not reflectively consistent, right? Could there be that reflective consistency isn’t that important after all?
If it’s actually Omega.
No, because he asked for $1,000. :P
I went with the original description, sorry :)