Could you dive into the strategic approach challenges you see with quadratic voting a bit further? The way I see it, a decentralised blockchain which rewards consensus can ensure honesty using simple game-theoretic principles. Quadratic voting is especially useful in reputation scoring, where both the magnitude and the diversity of the votes are important to ensure robustness.
More specifically, I’m referring to the quadratic voting method proposed in the Capital Restricted Liberal Radicalism paper. I’m assuming you’re referring to the same thing, however I’ll state it for clarity:
An example would be where people earn non-transferable “RP” which can be “staked” on other individuals, following which they earn or lose rep based on the sq.(sum(delta change)) of all individuals staked. Similarly, the person in favour of whom these stakes are made, increases his RP by applying the quadratic vote formula above on all stakes received.
Assuming RP is tied to a tangible incentive (like better interest rates), such a system should incentivise picking trustworthy people, and picking as many of them as possible; since picking trustworthy people is the most likely way to achieve consensus, cause a positive delta change, and thus gain RP.
Is there some major mode of failure I’m missing? Do you see quadratic voting of this kind becoming more important as we create consensus mechanisms that can increase the likelihood of honesty?
Hey
Could you dive into the strategic approach challenges you see with quadratic voting a bit further? The way I see it, a decentralised blockchain which rewards consensus can ensure honesty using simple game-theoretic principles. Quadratic voting is especially useful in reputation scoring, where both the magnitude and the diversity of the votes are important to ensure robustness.
More specifically, I’m referring to the quadratic voting method proposed in the Capital Restricted Liberal Radicalism paper. I’m assuming you’re referring to the same thing, however I’ll state it for clarity:
Vote received = Sq.(Sq.Rt. Vote1 + sq.rt. vote2 … + sq.rt. voteN)
An example would be where people earn non-transferable “RP” which can be “staked” on other individuals, following which they earn or lose rep based on the sq.(sum(delta change)) of all individuals staked. Similarly, the person in favour of whom these stakes are made, increases his RP by applying the quadratic vote formula above on all stakes received.
Assuming RP is tied to a tangible incentive (like better interest rates), such a system should incentivise picking trustworthy people, and picking as many of them as possible; since picking trustworthy people is the most likely way to achieve consensus, cause a positive delta change, and thus gain RP.
Is there some major mode of failure I’m missing? Do you see quadratic voting of this kind becoming more important as we create consensus mechanisms that can increase the likelihood of honesty?