[Link] “Doing being rational: polymerase chain reaction” by David Chapman

This is a link post for:

I’m not going to quote the content at the link itself. [Should I?]

David Chapman – the author of the linked post – claims that “meta-rational” methods are necessary to ‘reason reasonably’. I, and I think a lot of other people broadly part of the greater rationalist community, have objected to that general distinction. I still stand by that objection, at least terminologically.

But with this post and other previous recent posts/​‘pages’ that he’s posted at his site Meaningness, I think I’m better understanding the points he was gesturing or hinting at with what he describes as meta-rationality and I think that’s because ‘rationality’, in his understanding, is grounded in the actual behavior people perform. The notion that Richard Feynman is quoted as insisting on of having to “work on paper”, or the idea of ‘repair’ are almost certainly real and important facts about how we actually reason.

I think there’s less and less object-level disagreement between him and myself, even about something like ‘Bayesian reasoning’. His recent writing has crystalized the notion in me that he’s really on to something and dispelled the notion that we shared some kind of fundamental disagreement. It seems relatively unimportant whether I or others subsume ‘meta-rationality’ within ‘rationality’ (or not).

I’m less sure how much of this applies to arbitrary reasoners or artificial intelligence, e.g. an AI could maintain a checklist ‘internally’ instead of relying on an external physical device to perform the same function, but the ideas he’s discussing seem to be insightful and true to me about our own rational practices nonetheless.