Good post, and I agree with your conclusion, but I’d try a different tack to get there—one that’s probably the same argument encoded differently.
Instead of talking about “desires for the well-being of others” vs. “self-interested desires”, I’d throw out the whole desire language and use the language of behaviorism here. Seeing others in pain is negatively reinforcing. Helping others is positively reinforcing. Therefore we help others.
Instead of the question “what desire is at the root of your helping behavior?” this suggests the question “why is helping others reinforcing?” to which the answer is probably evolutionary and has nothing to do with the character of the person in question.
If you then ask the altruist what desires motivated their action, they’ll make something up, the same way people usually make up their reasons for stuff.
Also, am I understanding the experiment table right in saying that when subjects felt high empathy for Elaine, they were more willing to stay when escaping was easy than when it was difficult? Any ideas why that might be?
Stylistically, I would organize the article around the cleverness of the experiments. I’d invite the reader to pause and think of how to test the questions at hand, with hints. This has the benefits of stretching people’s minds, making people less prone to arguments from ignorance because it confronts them with the fact they couldn’t think of how to test something and thought it impossible, making them feel good when they can think of how to test it, and it might even lead to someone thinking of a novel and superior way to do so.
Then I’d linger on how details of the experiment disambiguates subjects’ reasons behind actions. This makes the issue an exercise in problem solving rather than receiving a teacher’s password from authority.
It is of course lukeprog’s show, and he’s doing a great job. His way has its advantages.
Also, am I understanding the experiment table right in saying that when subjects felt high empathy for Elaine, they were more willing to stay when escaping was easy than when it was difficult? Any ideas why that might be?
The numbers are in that direction, but I’m pretty sure the difference is not statistically significant.
I am confused as to how the experiment was set up.
In one case, the subject chose between watching eight sessions of shocks or being shocked in eight sessions, in the other, the subject chose between leaving, in which case the actor would be shocked for eight sessions, or being shocked for eight sessions.
In the latter case, did the subject have the option to watch eight sessions? If not, what reason was given to the subjects, as it makes no sense from their perspective for the actor to be obligated in the experiment wile they are exempt when it is the actor who is squeamish under electricity. If so, then the cases are not symmetrical, right? There would be three options for the “easy” escape condition, but only two for the “difficult” one.
Perhaps this construct of options directed people to switch. For example, they may have felt more guilty about taking the most self-serving of three options than of two.
Good post, and I agree with your conclusion, but I’d try a different tack to get there—one that’s probably the same argument encoded differently.
Instead of talking about “desires for the well-being of others” vs. “self-interested desires”, I’d throw out the whole desire language and use the language of behaviorism here. Seeing others in pain is negatively reinforcing. Helping others is positively reinforcing. Therefore we help others.
Instead of the question “what desire is at the root of your helping behavior?” this suggests the question “why is helping others reinforcing?” to which the answer is probably evolutionary and has nothing to do with the character of the person in question.
If you then ask the altruist what desires motivated their action, they’ll make something up, the same way people usually make up their reasons for stuff.
Also, am I understanding the experiment table right in saying that when subjects felt high empathy for Elaine, they were more willing to stay when escaping was easy than when it was difficult? Any ideas why that might be?
Stylistically, I would organize the article around the cleverness of the experiments. I’d invite the reader to pause and think of how to test the questions at hand, with hints. This has the benefits of stretching people’s minds, making people less prone to arguments from ignorance because it confronts them with the fact they couldn’t think of how to test something and thought it impossible, making them feel good when they can think of how to test it, and it might even lead to someone thinking of a novel and superior way to do so.
Then I’d linger on how details of the experiment disambiguates subjects’ reasons behind actions. This makes the issue an exercise in problem solving rather than receiving a teacher’s password from authority.
It is of course lukeprog’s show, and he’s doing a great job. His way has its advantages.
The numbers are in that direction, but I’m pretty sure the difference is not statistically significant.
I am confused as to how the experiment was set up.
In one case, the subject chose between watching eight sessions of shocks or being shocked in eight sessions, in the other, the subject chose between leaving, in which case the actor would be shocked for eight sessions, or being shocked for eight sessions.
In the latter case, did the subject have the option to watch eight sessions? If not, what reason was given to the subjects, as it makes no sense from their perspective for the actor to be obligated in the experiment wile they are exempt when it is the actor who is squeamish under electricity. If so, then the cases are not symmetrical, right? There would be three options for the “easy” escape condition, but only two for the “difficult” one.
Perhaps this construct of options directed people to switch. For example, they may have felt more guilty about taking the most self-serving of three options than of two.