If you treat identity as an equality relation, transitive and symmetric closures will force it into a weird and not very useful concept. If you don’t treat identity as an equality relation, “identity” is a very confusing word to use. The first case isn’t very illuminating, and the second case should taboo the word “identity”.
My reaction to that is we shouldn’t be asking “is it me”, but “how much of me does it replicate?” Cause, if we make identity a similarity relation, it will have to bridge enough small differentiations that eventually it will connect us to entities which barely resemble us at all.
However, Could you expound the way of this definition of identity under transitivity and symmetry for us? I’m not sure I’ve got a good handle on what those constraints would permit.
If you treat identity as an equality relation, transitive and symmetric closures will force it into a weird and not very useful concept. If you don’t treat identity as an equality relation, “identity” is a very confusing word to use. The first case isn’t very illuminating, and the second case should taboo the word “identity”.
My reaction to that is we shouldn’t be asking “is it me”, but “how much of me does it replicate?” Cause, if we make identity a similarity relation, it will have to bridge enough small differentiations that eventually it will connect us to entities which barely resemble us at all.
However, Could you expound the way of this definition of identity under transitivity and symmetry for us? I’m not sure I’ve got a good handle on what those constraints would permit.
Comment Retracted