I read Parfit’s article “The Unimportance of Identity” and was incredibly frustrated. It reminded me of the Matrix Trilogy, in that it started out so well, but then bombed entirely at the end.
I was with him at first. I accept the Reductionist description of how the human mind works. But I became frustrated when he started insisting that identity didn’t matter because, for instance, it might be possible to divide me into two identical persons. He argued that I couldn’t be identical to two persons at once, but I see no problem with saying that both of the people resulting are identical to me.
I recognize that that is sort of quibbling over definitions. Whether or not you think the two people are identical to you or not doesn’t change any physical facts. But words like “same” and “identical” have such power within the human brain that I think an attempt to detach them from their proper referents will result in bad thinking. I think that Parfit does, in fact suffer from that at the end of the essay.
But let’s overlook that. Parfit and I both agree that what is morally important, what we care about, is that we possess a certain relationship of psychological continuity with one or more future people (I’ll call this relationship “R” for short). I would argue that we should use the words “same person” and “personal identity” to refer to R, while Parfit would not. Fine. We agree about what’s really important, our only disagreement is about the meanings of words.
But then Parfit throws a total curve ball. He finishes up this chapter by saying that we shouldn’t care about R either! He ends by saying that this understanding of identity means that his own death isn’t a big a deal, because there will be other people thinking thoughts and having experiences in the future. Why? We just established that R is important, and a world where Parfit is dead doesn’t have R! If R is what is important, and a world where Parfit is dead does not have R, then his death must be just as bad as ever, because it removes R from the world!
I was left utterly frustrated by the wrong turn at the end of the essay. Still, the beginning is quite thoughtful.
So basically:
-I agree with Parfit that “R” is what is important, although I go into much more detail about what I think “R” is than he does.
-I disagree with Parfit that the term “Personal Identity” is not an appropriate term to use to describe “R.” I think that if you are “R” with a person you are the same person as they are.
-I disagree with Parfit that a reductionist view of personal identity makes death less bad.
I read Parfit’s article “The Unimportance of Identity” and was incredibly frustrated. It reminded me of the Matrix Trilogy, in that it started out so well, but then bombed entirely at the end.
I was with him at first. I accept the Reductionist description of how the human mind works. But I became frustrated when he started insisting that identity didn’t matter because, for instance, it might be possible to divide me into two identical persons. He argued that I couldn’t be identical to two persons at once, but I see no problem with saying that both of the people resulting are identical to me.
I recognize that that is sort of quibbling over definitions. Whether or not you think the two people are identical to you or not doesn’t change any physical facts. But words like “same” and “identical” have such power within the human brain that I think an attempt to detach them from their proper referents will result in bad thinking. I think that Parfit does, in fact suffer from that at the end of the essay.
But let’s overlook that. Parfit and I both agree that what is morally important, what we care about, is that we possess a certain relationship of psychological continuity with one or more future people (I’ll call this relationship “R” for short). I would argue that we should use the words “same person” and “personal identity” to refer to R, while Parfit would not. Fine. We agree about what’s really important, our only disagreement is about the meanings of words.
But then Parfit throws a total curve ball. He finishes up this chapter by saying that we shouldn’t care about R either! He ends by saying that this understanding of identity means that his own death isn’t a big a deal, because there will be other people thinking thoughts and having experiences in the future. Why? We just established that R is important, and a world where Parfit is dead doesn’t have R! If R is what is important, and a world where Parfit is dead does not have R, then his death must be just as bad as ever, because it removes R from the world!
I was left utterly frustrated by the wrong turn at the end of the essay. Still, the beginning is quite thoughtful.
So basically:
-I agree with Parfit that “R” is what is important, although I go into much more detail about what I think “R” is than he does.
-I disagree with Parfit that the term “Personal Identity” is not an appropriate term to use to describe “R.” I think that if you are “R” with a person you are the same person as they are.
-I disagree with Parfit that a reductionist view of personal identity makes death less bad.