I have read this paper and it really isn’t that much about identity. What Bostrom is interested in are questions like this: Do two identical brains in identical states of suffering or pleasure count as x or 2x units of suffering or pleasure? (Bostrom argues 2x). Bostrom is pretty much agnostic on whether the two identical brains are the same person. He doesn’t make claims on whether the two brains are two separate people experience x units of suffering/pleasure each, or if they are one person experiencing 2x units of suffering/pleasure.
Also: http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/experience.pdf (has been open in a tab for a while now as Something I Really Should Read).
I have read this paper and it really isn’t that much about identity. What Bostrom is interested in are questions like this: Do two identical brains in identical states of suffering or pleasure count as x or 2x units of suffering or pleasure? (Bostrom argues 2x). Bostrom is pretty much agnostic on whether the two identical brains are the same person. He doesn’t make claims on whether the two brains are two separate people experience x units of suffering/pleasure each, or if they are one person experiencing 2x units of suffering/pleasure.