If your moral code penalizes things that make you feel bad, and doing X would make you feel bad, then is it fair to say that not doing X is part of your moral code?
I think the point Eliezer was getting at is that human morality is very complex, and statements like “I’m an egoist” sweep a lot of that under the rug. And to continue his example: what if the pill not only prevented all pain from your conscience, but also gave you enjoyment (in the form of seratonin or whatever) at least as good as what you get from empathy?
You’re right, human morality is more complex than I thought it was when “I am an egoist” seemed like a reasonable assertion, and all the fuzzies I got from “resolving” the question of ethics prevented me from properly updating my beliefs about my own ethical disposition.
If your moral code penalizes things that make you feel bad, and doing X would make you feel bad, then is it fair to say that not doing X is part of your moral code?
I think the point Eliezer was getting at is that human morality is very complex, and statements like “I’m an egoist” sweep a lot of that under the rug. And to continue his example: what if the pill not only prevented all pain from your conscience, but also gave you enjoyment (in the form of seratonin or whatever) at least as good as what you get from empathy?
You’re right, human morality is more complex than I thought it was when “I am an egoist” seemed like a reasonable assertion, and all the fuzzies I got from “resolving” the question of ethics prevented me from properly updating my beliefs about my own ethical disposition.
Statements like I’m an altruist do too. They are however less likley to be challenged.