I agree that we can’t “derive values from a purely logical standpoint”. But I disagree that we can’t meaningfully say “5 > 1” mathematically when talking about individual lives.
“We know that we value life, but we don’t really know what that means as a mathematical statement.”
But if we take ‘life has value’ as an axiom, then five lives are better than one, all else being equal.
I also disagree with your grounding of “good” and “bad.” You argue morality is derived from emotional states:
Our values are derived from the physical sensations in our body that we call emotion, which arises automatically in response to whatever is happening right now. Healthy values fulfill our emotional needs, and unhealthy values do not.
In my view, fundamentally we map our perceptions, distinct from the emotions which they may evoke, onto the concepts of “good” and “bad”: positive experiences (pleasure, well-being) are the origin of the notion of good; negative experiences (pain, suffering) are that of bad.
So, if one unit of my displeasure results in five units of others’ pleasure, we can reasonably call that outcome objectively good—all else held equal.
But to be clear, I’m not claiming that people are obliged to always do the good thing. And I’m not a utilitarian. I don’t think suffering ought to be minimized. I think some level of suffering, both in the individual and in the society, is desirable for the wisdom it confers.
I respect your attempt to give an honest critique of the EA ideology on its home turf. But your conclusion about “letting go of the lever and walking away” seems naïve.
“What’s actually going on here is that we have completely forgotten how to let go of the lever and walk away.”
This isn’t truly a step outside the bounds of the moral game—it’s choosing inaction. Walking away still places you within the moral plane of the trolley problem, not above it. Part of the power of the trolley problem is the realization that you can’t absolve yourself from guilt.
The reality is that people suffer now, and if you’re capable of reducing that suffering, in my view, it’s objectively good to do so.
I don’t consider myself an effective altruist, but it’s reductive to characterize EA as merely about maximizing income for charity. In my view, its essence can’t be accurately decompressed from the name itself. As soon as you attempt to unpack what it really means, you move away from the actual thing that binds the community together—trying to be altruistic effectively.
I agree that we can’t “derive values from a purely logical standpoint”. But I disagree that we can’t meaningfully say “5 > 1” mathematically when talking about individual lives.
But if we take ‘life has value’ as an axiom, then five lives are better than one, all else being equal.
I also disagree with your grounding of “good” and “bad.” You argue morality is derived from emotional states:
In my view, fundamentally we map our perceptions, distinct from the emotions which they may evoke, onto the concepts of “good” and “bad”: positive experiences (pleasure, well-being) are the origin of the notion of good; negative experiences (pain, suffering) are that of bad.
So, if one unit of my displeasure results in five units of others’ pleasure, we can reasonably call that outcome objectively good—all else held equal.
But to be clear, I’m not claiming that people are obliged to always do the good thing. And I’m not a utilitarian. I don’t think suffering ought to be minimized. I think some level of suffering, both in the individual and in the society, is desirable for the wisdom it confers.
I respect your attempt to give an honest critique of the EA ideology on its home turf. But your conclusion about “letting go of the lever and walking away” seems naïve.
This isn’t truly a step outside the bounds of the moral game—it’s choosing inaction. Walking away still places you within the moral plane of the trolley problem, not above it. Part of the power of the trolley problem is the realization that you can’t absolve yourself from guilt.
The reality is that people suffer now, and if you’re capable of reducing that suffering, in my view, it’s objectively good to do so.
I don’t consider myself an effective altruist, but it’s reductive to characterize EA as merely about maximizing income for charity. In my view, its essence can’t be accurately decompressed from the name itself. As soon as you attempt to unpack what it really means, you move away from the actual thing that binds the community together—trying to be altruistic effectively.