In the beginning came the idea that we can’t just toss out Aristotle’s armchair reasoning and replace it with different armchair reasoning. We need to talk to Nature, and actually listen to what It says in reply. This, itself, was a stroke of genius.
If you do a probability-theoretic calculation correctly, you’re going to get the rational answer.
How does one make sure that this “probability-theoretic calculation” is not a “different armchair reasoning”?
Science doesn’t trust your rationality, and it doesn’t rely on your ability to use probability theory as the arbiter of truth. It wants you to set up a definitive experiment. [...] Science is built around the assumption that you’re too stupid and self-deceiving to just use Solomonoff induction.
This seems like a safe assumption. On the other hand, trusting in your powers of Solomonoff induction and Bayesianism doesn’t seem like one: what if you suck at estimating priors and too unimaginative to account for all the likely alternatives?
So, are you going to believe in faster-than-light quantum “collapse” fairies after all? Or do you think you’re smarter than that?
Again a straw-collapse. No one believes in faster-than-light quantum “collapse”, except for maybe some philosophers of physics.
The collapse model says that after performing a local measurement, the wavefunction locally evolves from the eigenstate that has been measured, nothing else. For a local observer spacelike separated events do no exist until they come into causal contact with it. That’s the earliest time that can be called a measurement time.
For a local observer spacelike separated events do no exist until they come into causal contact with it.
That sounds like mind projection fallacy. That the observer does not know about the events doesn’t mean they don’t exist.
That’s the earliest time that can be called a measurement time.
That would imply that whatever measurements we make locally, from the perspective of an observer who hasn’t yet interacted with those measurements, our wave function hasn’t collapsed yet, and we remain in superposition.
So, how does it make sense that the wave function has collapsed from our perspective?
For a thing to exist, it means that thing is part of the reality that embeds our minds and our experience, whether or not that thing has an effect on our minds and our experience. Of course when I say something exists, it is a prediction of my model of reality. And you might ask how I can defend my model in favor of an alternative that says different things about events with no effect on my experience, and my answer would be that I prefer models that use the same rules whether or not I am looking, in which my reducible mind is not treated as ontologically fundamental.
Reality is the thing that produces our experience and which we are trying to describe with our models. Stop playing dumb.
If there is a single lesson from QM, it is that looking (=measurement) affects what happens. This has nothing to do with minds.
Yes, looking affects what happens, but that is fully accounted for by the physical process of looking. That is, the effect of looking can be predicted and explained by treating the observer with the same laws of physics as whatever is observed. This does not mean you can make stuff up about unobserved events, or claim that events haven’t really happened until they are observed (“For a local observer spacelike separated events do no exist until they come into causal contact with it.”).
Sorry for having been rude, but I really believe you should have understood my normal usage of “reality” from context, and I was annoyed already that you asked me to taboo “exist” which you introduced to the conversation.
Nonetheless, I have made substantial criticisms against your position, which you have not responded to. Whether or not you continue this exchange, you should take them into account as you continue your complaints about MWI advocacy.
Totally agreed. Thing is in general incomputable, how much more you need not to trust yourself doing it correctly? Clearly you can’t have a process that relies on computing incomputable things right. I’m becoming increasingly convinced, either via confirmation bias, or via proper updates, that Eliezer skipped helluva lot of fundamentals.
How does one make sure that this “probability-theoretic calculation” is not a “different armchair reasoning”?
This seems like a safe assumption. On the other hand, trusting in your powers of Solomonoff induction and Bayesianism doesn’t seem like one: what if you suck at estimating priors and too unimaginative to account for all the likely alternatives?
Again a straw-collapse. No one believes in faster-than-light quantum “collapse”, except for maybe some philosophers of physics.
Speed of light or slower collapse, applied to spatially separated measurements of entangled particles, seems even more ridiculous.
The collapse model says that after performing a local measurement, the wavefunction locally evolves from the eigenstate that has been measured, nothing else. For a local observer spacelike separated events do no exist until they come into causal contact with it. That’s the earliest time that can be called a measurement time.
That sounds like mind projection fallacy. That the observer does not know about the events doesn’t mean they don’t exist.
That would imply that whatever measurements we make locally, from the perspective of an observer who hasn’t yet interacted with those measurements, our wave function hasn’t collapsed yet, and we remain in superposition.
So, how does it make sense that the wave function has collapsed from our perspective?
“Exist” should be a taboo word, until you can explain it in terms of other QM concepts.
For a thing to exist, it means that thing is part of the reality that embeds our minds and our experience, whether or not that thing has an effect on our minds and our experience. Of course when I say something exists, it is a prediction of my model of reality. And you might ask how I can defend my model in favor of an alternative that says different things about events with no effect on my experience, and my answer would be that I prefer models that use the same rules whether or not I am looking, in which my reducible mind is not treated as ontologically fundamental.
“Reality” is another taboo word. We have no direct QM experience.
If there is a single lesson from QM, it is that looking (=measurement) affects what happens. This has nothing to do with minds.
Reality is the thing that produces our experience and which we are trying to describe with our models. Stop playing dumb.
Yes, looking affects what happens, but that is fully accounted for by the physical process of looking. That is, the effect of looking can be predicted and explained by treating the observer with the same laws of physics as whatever is observed. This does not mean you can make stuff up about unobserved events, or claim that events haven’t really happened until they are observed (“For a local observer spacelike separated events do no exist until they come into causal contact with it.”).
I’m perfectly happy with the models being testable experimentally, without introducing this untestable thing you call reality.
I guess this concludes our exchange.
Sorry for having been rude, but I really believe you should have understood my normal usage of “reality” from context, and I was annoyed already that you asked me to taboo “exist” which you introduced to the conversation.
Nonetheless, I have made substantial criticisms against your position, which you have not responded to. Whether or not you continue this exchange, you should take them into account as you continue your complaints about MWI advocacy.
Totally agreed. Thing is in general incomputable, how much more you need not to trust yourself doing it correctly? Clearly you can’t have a process that relies on computing incomputable things right. I’m becoming increasingly convinced, either via confirmation bias, or via proper updates, that Eliezer skipped helluva lot of fundamentals.