My main remark is that Eliezer doesn’t need to rely on induction to justify induction. The mere assumption that the universe has natural laws is enough. Given that, one can look at the universe timelessly, and say, “I see evidence of this natural law, and, given that the universe has such a natural law, this will happen tomorrow.” Then we aren’t predicting the future based on the past; we’re predicting the future based on our conception of the natural laws of the universe, which just happens to arise from observations we’ve made in the past. This removes circularity, but requires an additional assumption (which, if false, implies skepticism, as far as I can see).
Well, if his evidence for the existence of natural laws is not itself based on induction, he escapes circularity
No one knows what a natural law is, and no one has detected one by direct inspection. The popular answer, that they are “just descriptions” fails particularly badly if one is trying to demonstrate how one has avoided circularity.
Well, if his evidence for the existence of natural laws is not itself based on induction, he escapes circularity
No one knows what a natural law is, and no one has detected one by direct inspection. The popular answer, that they are “just descriptions” fails particularly badly if one is trying to demonstrate how one has avoided circularity.
PS thanks for the Kelley link.