There are also people in every possible state of suffering. So my question is: is it wrong to switch the computer on, setting it executing all those programs simultaneously in different histories? Is it, in fact, the worst crime ever committed? Or is it merely inadvisable, because the combined measure of all the histories containing suffering is very tiny? Or is it innocent and trivial?
I’m not so sure we have the computing power to “simulate a person,” but suppose we did. (Perhaps we will soon.) How would you respond to this worry?
Assuming we have sufficiently dense register as to provide for a human consciousness within a quantum randomizer’s memory bank.
Assuming many-worlds.
Every available mental state would occur infinitely many times despite being an infinitessimal likelihood of the device. Those mental states where the suffering is sufficiently great as to cause the sentience to prefer not existing at all is necessarily a minor portion of the total of those who suffer. Those who neither suffer nor prosper likely also prefer existing, in the main. Those who prosper also overwhelmingly (likely) prefer to exist.
Should we allow those entities, hypothetically, to vote on whether they should be brought into existence at all—as a group, it is my belief that they would vote “yes”.
Of course, I’m something of a heretic here at LW in that I do not accept postulate #2. (Note: I do not accept the “Copenhagen Interpretation” either.)
I don’t see the words “perfect copy” or even just “copy” used anywhere in the article, only simulation and representation. That consciousness can be produced in a traditional silicon computer via an algorithm merely isomorphic to the processes in the human brain is an assumption I don’t yet grant.
Correct, but I did in item one postulate “a human consciousness”.
Is a human consciousness not a person, merely because it is a simulated human consciousness?
That consciousness can be produced in a traditional silicon computer via an algorithm merely isomorphic to the processes in the human brain is an assumption I don’t yet grant.
I think you and I are using very different understandings of what postulated item #1 meant.
Pascal’s Mugging rang. It wants tree-fiddy.
Assuming we have sufficiently dense register as to provide for a human consciousness within a quantum randomizer’s memory bank.
Assuming many-worlds.
Every available mental state would occur infinitely many times despite being an infinitessimal likelihood of the device. Those mental states where the suffering is sufficiently great as to cause the sentience to prefer not existing at all is necessarily a minor portion of the total of those who suffer. Those who neither suffer nor prosper likely also prefer existing, in the main. Those who prosper also overwhelmingly (likely) prefer to exist.
Should we allow those entities, hypothetically, to vote on whether they should be brought into existence at all—as a group, it is my belief that they would vote “yes”.
Of course, I’m something of a heretic here at LW in that I do not accept postulate #2. (Note: I do not accept the “Copenhagen Interpretation” either.)
Also:
Assuming simulations of people are people.
I understand “perfect copy” to mean that it is the thing it is a copy of—functionally and observationally indistinguishable.
I don’t see the words “perfect copy” or even just “copy” used anywhere in the article, only simulation and representation. That consciousness can be produced in a traditional silicon computer via an algorithm merely isomorphic to the processes in the human brain is an assumption I don’t yet grant.
Correct, but I did in item one postulate “a human consciousness”.
Is a human consciousness not a person, merely because it is a simulated human consciousness?
I think you and I are using very different understandings of what postulated item #1 meant.