I don’t understand. If it is not known which model is correct, can’t a Bayesian choose policies by the predictive distributions of consequences after marginalizing out the choice of model? Robin seems to be invoking an academic norm of only using vetted quantitative models on important questions, and he seems to be partly expecting that the intuitive force of this norm should somehow result in an agreement that his position is epistemically superior. Can’t the intuitive force of the norm be translated into a justification in something like the game theory of human rhetoric? For example, perhaps the norm is popular in academia because everyone half-consciously understands that the norm is meant to stop people from using the strategy of selecting models which lead to emotionally compelling predictions? Is there a more optimal way to approximate the contributions (compelling or otherwise) of non-vetted models to an ideal posterior belief? If Eliezer is breaking a normal procedural safeguard in human rhetoric, one should clarify the specific epistemic consequences that should be expected when people break that safeguard, and not just repeatedly point out that he is breaking it.
I don’t understand. If it is not known which model is correct, can’t a Bayesian choose policies by the predictive distributions of consequences after marginalizing out the choice of model? Robin seems to be invoking an academic norm of only using vetted quantitative models on important questions, and he seems to be partly expecting that the intuitive force of this norm should somehow result in an agreement that his position is epistemically superior. Can’t the intuitive force of the norm be translated into a justification in something like the game theory of human rhetoric? For example, perhaps the norm is popular in academia because everyone half-consciously understands that the norm is meant to stop people from using the strategy of selecting models which lead to emotionally compelling predictions? Is there a more optimal way to approximate the contributions (compelling or otherwise) of non-vetted models to an ideal posterior belief? If Eliezer is breaking a normal procedural safeguard in human rhetoric, one should clarify the specific epistemic consequences that should be expected when people break that safeguard, and not just repeatedly point out that he is breaking it.