Scott, isn’t the point here that even seemingly iron-clad philosophical reasoning can be invalidated by empirical physical discoveries? That physics, in effect, supercedes logic, rather than vice versa?
Some philosophers, I think including Chalmers, argue that no conceivable physical evidence could make the “hard problem” of consciousness go away. They suggest that there is a limit on the kinds of information we can receive from experiments on the physical world, and that no matter what specific information we receive from those experiments, their philosophical reasoning will still be sound and untouched. Eliezer aims to show by this example that even the most convincing-seeming philosophical reasoning can be totally upended by experimental results. Hence philosophers should be more cautious about the strength of their claims and admit that new experiments could show them to be in error. But it seems that at least some well respected philosophers will not do this.
On the other hand, philosophers of course admit that indeed there have been many instances in the past where seemingly strong philosophical arguments have turned out not only to be wrong, but fundamentally misguided. At the same time, logic and reasoning are the tools our minds use to comprehend the universe, and if we mistrust our reasoning then we can’t really hope to make any progress at all in our understanding. Hence the burden of proof must remain on those who claim that a proposed logical argument is invalid, by showing where it goes wrong. It is not adequate merely to say that flaws may be discovered in the future, or that new paradigms may someday be forced on us by unexpected discoveries that will show our best arguments today to be completely wrong-headed. All arguments contain an implicit “I may be wrong” clause, because humans are imperfect. The fact remains that some arguments are stronger than others, and if you want to reject an argument’s conclusions it is not enough to just say that someday we will see why it was wrong.
Scott, isn’t the point here that even seemingly iron-clad philosophical reasoning can be invalidated by empirical physical discoveries? That physics, in effect, supercedes logic, rather than vice versa?
Some philosophers, I think including Chalmers, argue that no conceivable physical evidence could make the “hard problem” of consciousness go away. They suggest that there is a limit on the kinds of information we can receive from experiments on the physical world, and that no matter what specific information we receive from those experiments, their philosophical reasoning will still be sound and untouched. Eliezer aims to show by this example that even the most convincing-seeming philosophical reasoning can be totally upended by experimental results. Hence philosophers should be more cautious about the strength of their claims and admit that new experiments could show them to be in error. But it seems that at least some well respected philosophers will not do this.
On the other hand, philosophers of course admit that indeed there have been many instances in the past where seemingly strong philosophical arguments have turned out not only to be wrong, but fundamentally misguided. At the same time, logic and reasoning are the tools our minds use to comprehend the universe, and if we mistrust our reasoning then we can’t really hope to make any progress at all in our understanding. Hence the burden of proof must remain on those who claim that a proposed logical argument is invalid, by showing where it goes wrong. It is not adequate merely to say that flaws may be discovered in the future, or that new paradigms may someday be forced on us by unexpected discoveries that will show our best arguments today to be completely wrong-headed. All arguments contain an implicit “I may be wrong” clause, because humans are imperfect. The fact remains that some arguments are stronger than others, and if you want to reject an argument’s conclusions it is not enough to just say that someday we will see why it was wrong.