I add only that, in the case of the question as to whether experiments in physics or more likely cognitive science, could upend philosophical reasoning about consciousness being irreducible, there are a number of particular reasons for you to be suspicious; it is not simply a generic “might someday see why you were wrong”. So as soon as you appreciate how fragile “impeccable philosophical reasoning” really is, especially while the reasoned-about quantities still remain confusing, you suddenly begin to doubt impeccable philosophical reasoning about consciousness a great deal.
What Hal Finney said.
I add only that, in the case of the question as to whether experiments in physics or more likely cognitive science, could upend philosophical reasoning about consciousness being irreducible, there are a number of particular reasons for you to be suspicious; it is not simply a generic “might someday see why you were wrong”. So as soon as you appreciate how fragile “impeccable philosophical reasoning” really is, especially while the reasoned-about quantities still remain confusing, you suddenly begin to doubt impeccable philosophical reasoning about consciousness a great deal.