But since copies of us occur more frequently in universes with late filters than in universes with early filters, such a decision (which Robin arrives at via SIA) can be justified on utilitarian grounds under UDT.
But it seems like our copies in early-filter universes can eventually affect a proportionally greater share of the universe’s resources.
Also, Robin’s example of shelters seems mistaken: if shelters worked, some civilizations would already have tried them and colonized the universe. Whatever we try has to stand a chance of working against some unknown filter that almost nobody escapes. Which suggests the question of why learning that filter reduction doesn’t work is a reason to invest more in filter reduction. I’m not sure how to think about this in a way that doesn’t double-count things.
But it seems like our copies in early-filter universes can eventually affect a proportionally greater share of the universe’s resources.
Also, Robin’s example of shelters seems mistaken: if shelters worked, some civilizations would already have tried them and colonized the universe. Whatever we try has to stand a chance of working against some unknown filter that almost nobody escapes. Which suggests the question of why learning that filter reduction doesn’t work is a reason to invest more in filter reduction. I’m not sure how to think about this in a way that doesn’t double-count things.
Finally, I wish everyone would remember that filters and existential risks are different (though overlapping) things.