And that’s why I wrote “You seem to think that …”; I was describing why I thought you would privilege the hypothesis that lying would be better.
You’re absolutely right that learning to lie really well and actually lying to one’s family, the “genuinely wonderful people” they know, everyone in one’s “social structure” and business, as well as one’s husband and daughter MIGHT be the “compassionate thing to do”. But why would you pick out exactly that option among all the possibilities?
This is a rhetorical question …
Actually it wasn’t a rhetorical question. I was genuinely curious how you’d describe the boundary.
The reason why I think it’s a justified presumption to be honest to others is in fact because of a slippery slope argument. Human being’s minds run on corrupted hardware and deception is dangerous (for one reason) because it’s not always easy to cleanly separate one’s lies from one’s true beliefs. But your implication (that lying is sometimes right) is correct; there are some obvious or well-known schelling fences on that slippery slope, such as lying to the Nazis when they come to your house while you’re hiding Jews.
Your initial statement seemed rather cavalier and didn’t seem to be the product of sympathetic consideration of the original commenter’s situation.
Rationality can’t be wrong, but it can be misused.
“People can stand what is true, for they are already enduring it.” is technically correct, but omits factors relevant to the situations when most people consider lying to be necessary. The fact that you know something is true is itself a truth.
So if you reason “they have to endure the truth whether I tell them it or not”, you also have to acknowledge that by telling them you’ve added a second-order truth, and they now have to endure that second-order truth that they didn’t before. The implication that telling someone the truth doesn’t change anything because it didn’t change the original truth… isn’t true,
Of course most people don’t think in terms of “telling someone a truth adds another truth”, but if you try to analyze it, it turns out that it does.
If you care about the truth … then
Virtually nobody “cares about the truth” in the absolute sense needed to make that statement logically correct. Most people care about the truth as one of several things that they care about, which need to be balanced against each other.
Virtually nobody “cares about the truth” in the absolute sense needed to make that statement logically correct.
As a matter of logic nobody caring about the truth (in whatever sense is meant by the claim) is sufficient to ensure that the statement is always correct (the part replaced by the ellipsis need not be resolved). (The problem is that it is then probably useless.)
You’re absolutely right that learning to lie really well and actually lying to one’s family, the “genuinely wonderful people” they know, everyone in one’s “social structure” and business, as well as one’s husband and daughter MIGHT be the “compassionate thing to do”. But why would you pick out exactly that option among all the possibilities?
Because it’s a possibility that the post we’re talking about apparently did not consider. The Litany of Gendlin was mentioned in the original post, and I think that when interpreted as a way to interact with others, the Litany of Gendlin is obviously the wrong thing to do in some circumstances.
Perhaps having these beautifully phrased things with a person’s name attached is a liability. If I add a caveat that it’s only about one’s internal process, or it’s only about communication with people that either aspire to be rational or that you have no meaningful relationship with, then it’s not beautifully phrased anymore, and it’s not the Litany of Gendlin anymore, and it seems hopeless for the resulting Litany of Tim to get enough mindshare to matter.
But where exactly is the boundary dividing those things that, however uncomfortable or even devastating, must be said or written and those things about which one can decieve or dupe those one loves and respects?
Actually it wasn’t a rhetorical question. I was genuinely curious how you’d describe the boundary.
I’m not curious about that, and in the absence of financial incentives I’m not willing to try to answer that question. There is no simple description of how to deal with the world that’s something a reasonable person will actually want to do.
And that’s why I wrote “You seem to think that …”; I was describing why I thought you would privilege the hypothesis that lying would be better.
You’re absolutely right that learning to lie really well and actually lying to one’s family, the “genuinely wonderful people” they know, everyone in one’s “social structure” and business, as well as one’s husband and daughter MIGHT be the “compassionate thing to do”. But why would you pick out exactly that option among all the possibilities?
Actually it wasn’t a rhetorical question. I was genuinely curious how you’d describe the boundary.
The reason why I think it’s a justified presumption to be honest to others is in fact because of a slippery slope argument. Human being’s minds run on corrupted hardware and deception is dangerous (for one reason) because it’s not always easy to cleanly separate one’s lies from one’s true beliefs. But your implication (that lying is sometimes right) is correct; there are some obvious or well-known schelling fences on that slippery slope, such as lying to the Nazis when they come to your house while you’re hiding Jews.
Your initial statement seemed rather cavalier and didn’t seem to be the product of sympathetic consideration of the original commenter’s situation.
Have you considered Crocker’s rules? If you care about the truth or you have something to protect then the Litany of Gendlin is a reminder of why you might adopt Crocker’s rules, despite the truth possibly not being the “compassionate thing to do”.
Rationality can’t be wrong, but it can be misused.
“People can stand what is true, for they are already enduring it.” is technically correct, but omits factors relevant to the situations when most people consider lying to be necessary. The fact that you know something is true is itself a truth.
So if you reason “they have to endure the truth whether I tell them it or not”, you also have to acknowledge that by telling them you’ve added a second-order truth, and they now have to endure that second-order truth that they didn’t before. The implication that telling someone the truth doesn’t change anything because it didn’t change the original truth… isn’t true,
Of course most people don’t think in terms of “telling someone a truth adds another truth”, but if you try to analyze it, it turns out that it does.
Virtually nobody “cares about the truth” in the absolute sense needed to make that statement logically correct. Most people care about the truth as one of several things that they care about, which need to be balanced against each other.
As a matter of logic nobody caring about the truth (in whatever sense is meant by the claim) is sufficient to ensure that the statement is always correct (the part replaced by the ellipsis need not be resolved). (The problem is that it is then probably useless.)
Because it’s a possibility that the post we’re talking about apparently did not consider. The Litany of Gendlin was mentioned in the original post, and I think that when interpreted as a way to interact with others, the Litany of Gendlin is obviously the wrong thing to do in some circumstances.
Perhaps having these beautifully phrased things with a person’s name attached is a liability. If I add a caveat that it’s only about one’s internal process, or it’s only about communication with people that either aspire to be rational or that you have no meaningful relationship with, then it’s not beautifully phrased anymore, and it’s not the Litany of Gendlin anymore, and it seems hopeless for the resulting Litany of Tim to get enough mindshare to matter.
I’m not curious about that, and in the absence of financial incentives I’m not willing to try to answer that question. There is no simple description of how to deal with the world that’s something a reasonable person will actually want to do.