If Moral Parliament can make deals, it could as well decide on a single goal to be followed thereafter, at which point moral uncertainty is resolved (at least formally). For this to be a good idea, the resulting goal has to be sensitive to facts discovered in the future.
The “Eve” delegates want the “Tom” delegates to have less power no matter what, so they will support a deal that gives the “Tom” delegates less expected power in the near term. The “Tom” delegates give greater value to open-ended futures, so they will trade away power in the near term in exchange for more power if the future turns out to be open ended.
So this seems to be a case where both parties support a deal that takes away sensitivity if the future turns out to be short. Both parties support a deal that gives the “Eve” delegates more power in that case.
The “Eve” delegates want the “Tom” delegates to have less power no matter what, so they will support a deal that gives the “Tom” delegates less expected power in the near term. The “Tom” delegates give greater value to open-ended futures, so they will trade away power in the near term in exchange for more power if the future turns out to be open ended.
So this seems to be a case where both parties support a deal that takes away sensitivity if the future turns out to be short. Both parties support a deal that gives the “Eve” delegates more power in that case.