If you read the original post by Eliezer, he uses the “sanity waterline” concept only as a loose metaphor. But since then the phrase itself seems to have taken on a life of its own.
If you read the original post by Eliezer, he uses the “sanity waterline” concept only as a loose metaphor. But since then the phrase itself seems to have taken on a life of its own.
Yes, I’ve read the original post. In my opinion, its main point is incorrect and it’s illusory to talk about a “sanity waterline” even as a loose metaphor.
If a belief is high-status and without personal harmful effects for those who hold it, it doesn’t matter at all how much it violates the basic principles of sound epistemology, logic, etc. -- even the smartest people will be drawn to it like iron dust to a magnet. Now, Eliezer looks at those few Nobel-winning scientists who adhere seriously to some traditional religion and sees them as an especially extreme example of irrationality that uniquely sticks out. Whereas in reality, the reason they stick out is not that they are especially irrational by some objective measure, but that they don’t conform to the prevailing status dynamic: traditional religion has been low-status among the intellectual elites for quite some time now. Among the beliefs that are high-status and shared by a whole lot of scientists—let alone the rest of the intellectual elite—many are, in my opinion, far more irrational, but don’t stick out simply because it’s considered a normal or even expected thing for a high-status person to believe. [1]
In that post, Eliezer almost reached the correct insight when he remarked how weird it would be for someone who believes in Santa Claus to win a Nobel prize. What he should have asked at that point is whether there are beliefs that are equally irrational but their status relative to traditional religion is presently as high as the status of traditional religion relative to belief in Santa Claus. (Not an exact comparison, but you get the idea. Plus I also disagree that the latter two are comparable, but that’s a complex topic in its own right.)
[1] Here, of course, the argument stumbles onto a catch-22 situation, since giving any concrete examples of such beliefs is guaranteed to be a highly controversial assertion, and not giving any sounds like empty talk.
If you read the original post by Eliezer, he uses the “sanity waterline” concept only as a loose metaphor. But since then the phrase itself seems to have taken on a life of its own.
saturn:
Yes, I’ve read the original post. In my opinion, its main point is incorrect and it’s illusory to talk about a “sanity waterline” even as a loose metaphor.
If a belief is high-status and without personal harmful effects for those who hold it, it doesn’t matter at all how much it violates the basic principles of sound epistemology, logic, etc. -- even the smartest people will be drawn to it like iron dust to a magnet. Now, Eliezer looks at those few Nobel-winning scientists who adhere seriously to some traditional religion and sees them as an especially extreme example of irrationality that uniquely sticks out. Whereas in reality, the reason they stick out is not that they are especially irrational by some objective measure, but that they don’t conform to the prevailing status dynamic: traditional religion has been low-status among the intellectual elites for quite some time now. Among the beliefs that are high-status and shared by a whole lot of scientists—let alone the rest of the intellectual elite—many are, in my opinion, far more irrational, but don’t stick out simply because it’s considered a normal or even expected thing for a high-status person to believe. [1]
In that post, Eliezer almost reached the correct insight when he remarked how weird it would be for someone who believes in Santa Claus to win a Nobel prize. What he should have asked at that point is whether there are beliefs that are equally irrational but their status relative to traditional religion is presently as high as the status of traditional religion relative to belief in Santa Claus. (Not an exact comparison, but you get the idea. Plus I also disagree that the latter two are comparable, but that’s a complex topic in its own right.)
[1] Here, of course, the argument stumbles onto a catch-22 situation, since giving any concrete examples of such beliefs is guaranteed to be a highly controversial assertion, and not giving any sounds like empty talk.
Agreed. I used it partly in jest, to try and show that it WAS an unrealistic assumption.