I dunno, maybe this is just me complaining about consequentialism-in-general again with a different vocabulary.
(nods) I think so. Supposing that Bruce Wayne being Batman is a good thing, and supposing that his parents being killed was indispensible to him becoming Batman, then a consequentialist should endorse his parents having been killed. (Of course, we might ask why on earth we’re supposing those things, but that’s a different question.)
Supposing that Bruce Wayne being Batman is a good thing, and supposing that his parents being killed was indispensible to him becoming Batman, then a consequentialist should endorse his parents having been killed.
Disagree. P(parents killed | becoming like Batman) being high doesn’t imply that P(becoming like Batman | parents killed) is high.
I agree with your assertion, but I suspect we’re talking past each other, probably because I was cryptic.
Let me unpack a little, and see if you still disagree.
There’s 30-year-old Bruce over there, and we have established (somehow) that he is Batman, that this is a good thing, and that it would not have happened had his parents not been killed. (Further, we have established (somehow) that his parents’ continued survival would not have been an even better thing.)
And the question arises, was it a good thing that his parents were killed? (Not, “could we have known at the time that it was a good thing”, merely “was it, in retrospect, a good thing?”)
I’m saying a consequentialist answers “yes.”
If your disagreement still applies, then I haven’t followed your reasoning, and would appreciate it if you unpacked it for me.
As a consequentialist, I think the only good reason to judge past actions is to help make future decisions, so to me the question “was it a good thing that his parents were killed?” cashes out to “should we adopt a general policy of killing people’s parents?” and the answer is no. (I think Alicorn agrees with me.)
It seems to me like a bad idea to judge past actions on the basis of their observed results; this leaves you too susceptible to survivorship bias. Past actions should be judged on the basis of their expected results. If I adopt a bad investment strategy but end up making a lot of money anyway, that doesn’t imply that my investment strategy was a good idea.
I of course agree that adopting a general policy of killing people’s parents without reference to their attributes is a bad idea. It would most likely have bad consequences, after all. (Also, it violates rules against killing, and it’s something virtuous people don’t do.)
I agree that for a consequentialist, the only good reason to judge past actions is to help make future decisions.
I disagree that the question “was it a good thing that his parents were killed?” cashes out to “should we adopt a general policy of killing people’s parents?” I would say, rather, that it cashes out to “should we adopt a general policy of killing people who are similar to Bruce Wayne’s parents at the moment of their death?” (“People’s parents” is one such set, but not the only one, and I see no reason to privilege it.)
And I would say the consequentialist’s answer is “yes, for some kinds of similarity; no, for others.” (Which kinds of similarity? Well, we may not know yet. That requires further study.)
“should we adopt a general policy of killing people who are similar to Bruce Wayne’s parents at the moment of their death?”
My answer’s still no because of my first comment. The death of his parents is only one factor involved in Bruce Wayne’s becoming Batman. In Batman Begins, for example, another important factor is his training with the League of Shadows. The latter is not a predictable consequence of the former.
(nods) I think so. Supposing that Bruce Wayne being Batman is a good thing, and supposing that his parents being killed was indispensible to him becoming Batman, then a consequentialist should endorse his parents having been killed. (Of course, we might ask why on earth we’re supposing those things, but that’s a different question.)
Disagree. P(parents killed | becoming like Batman) being high doesn’t imply that P(becoming like Batman | parents killed) is high.
I agree with your assertion, but I suspect we’re talking past each other, probably because I was cryptic.
Let me unpack a little, and see if you still disagree.
There’s 30-year-old Bruce over there, and we have established (somehow) that he is Batman, that this is a good thing, and that it would not have happened had his parents not been killed. (Further, we have established (somehow) that his parents’ continued survival would not have been an even better thing.)
And the question arises, was it a good thing that his parents were killed? (Not, “could we have known at the time that it was a good thing”, merely “was it, in retrospect, a good thing?”)
I’m saying a consequentialist answers “yes.”
If your disagreement still applies, then I haven’t followed your reasoning, and would appreciate it if you unpacked it for me.
As a consequentialist, I think the only good reason to judge past actions is to help make future decisions, so to me the question “was it a good thing that his parents were killed?” cashes out to “should we adopt a general policy of killing people’s parents?” and the answer is no. (I think Alicorn agrees with me.)
It seems to me like a bad idea to judge past actions on the basis of their observed results; this leaves you too susceptible to survivorship bias. Past actions should be judged on the basis of their expected results. If I adopt a bad investment strategy but end up making a lot of money anyway, that doesn’t imply that my investment strategy was a good idea.
OK, that’s clear; thanks.
I of course agree that adopting a general policy of killing people’s parents without reference to their attributes is a bad idea. It would most likely have bad consequences, after all. (Also, it violates rules against killing, and it’s something virtuous people don’t do.)
I agree that for a consequentialist, the only good reason to judge past actions is to help make future decisions.
I disagree that the question “was it a good thing that his parents were killed?” cashes out to “should we adopt a general policy of killing people’s parents?” I would say, rather, that it cashes out to “should we adopt a general policy of killing people who are similar to Bruce Wayne’s parents at the moment of their death?” (“People’s parents” is one such set, but not the only one, and I see no reason to privilege it.)
And I would say the consequentialist’s answer is “yes, for some kinds of similarity; no, for others.” (Which kinds of similarity? Well, we may not know yet. That requires further study.)
My answer’s still no because of my first comment. The death of his parents is only one factor involved in Bruce Wayne’s becoming Batman. In Batman Begins, for example, another important factor is his training with the League of Shadows. The latter is not a predictable consequence of the former.
Ah, I see your point. Sure, that’s true.