It’s a meta-level/aliasing sort of problem, I think. You don’t believe it’s more ethical/moral to believe any specific proposition, you believe it’s more ethical/moral to believe ‘the proposition most likely to be true’, which is a variable which can be filled with whatever proposition the situation suggests, so it’s a different class of thing. Effectively it’s equivalent to ‘taking apparent truth as normative’, so I’d call it the only position of that format that is Bayesian.
It’s a meta-level/aliasing sort of problem, I think. You don’t believe it’s more ethical/moral to believe any specific proposition, you believe it’s more ethical/moral to believe ‘the proposition most likely to be true’, which is a variable which can be filled with whatever proposition the situation suggests, so it’s a different class of thing. Effectively it’s equivalent to ‘taking apparent truth as normative’, so I’d call it the only position of that format that is Bayesian.