There are a lot more complex than simple possible universes, so the assumption that an individual simple possible universe is more probable than an individual complex possible universe (which is the assumption being made here) is not the same thing as the assumption that all simple universes considered together are more probable than all complex universes considered together (i.e., the assumption that the universe is probably simple). (Not saying you disagree, but it’s probably good to be careful around the distinction.)
I suspect I’m going to be trying to make this point again at some point—I’ve had difficulty in the past explaining the problem of induction, and though I know about Solomonoff induction I only realised today that the whole problem is all about priors. I tried to to be explicit about which side of the distinction you draw I was speaking, but any thoughts on how I can make it clearer in future? Thanks!
There are a lot more complex than simple possible universes, so the assumption that an individual simple possible universe is more probable than an individual complex possible universe (which is the assumption being made here) is not the same thing as the assumption that all simple universes considered together are more probable than all complex universes considered together (i.e., the assumption that the universe is probably simple). (Not saying you disagree, but it’s probably good to be careful around the distinction.)
I suspect I’m going to be trying to make this point again at some point—I’ve had difficulty in the past explaining the problem of induction, and though I know about Solomonoff induction I only realised today that the whole problem is all about priors. I tried to to be explicit about which side of the distinction you draw I was speaking, but any thoughts on how I can make it clearer in future? Thanks!