Gary Drescher fleshes this out in Good and Real (referring to Newcomb’s problem where both boxes are transparent, emphasis is mine):
Another way to justify the one-box choice is to note that for all you know, you might be the simulated you; hence you should act in part for your (causal) influence on the simulation outcome....Say the real you assumes that it is the real you. Nothing false can logically follow from that true (even if unjustified) assumption; in particular, nothing false follows as to which choice is in fact more lucrative for you to make. (The simulated you might, however, infer false conclusions from its false assumption that it is the real you.)
And I paraphrase the last sentence of that footnote: Therefore, the one-box choice is more lucrative for you only if you cannot safely assume that you are the real you.
(The original sentence was, “So the one-box choice is more lucrative for you only if you cannot infer otherwise by assuming that you are indeed the real you,” which, to me, is most clearly read as expressing the opposite of what Drescher meant to express.)
Gary Drescher fleshes this out in Good and Real (referring to Newcomb’s problem where both boxes are transparent, emphasis is mine):
And I paraphrase the last sentence of that footnote: Therefore, the one-box choice is more lucrative for you only if you cannot safely assume that you are the real you.
(The original sentence was, “So the one-box choice is more lucrative for you only if you cannot infer otherwise by assuming that you are indeed the real you,” which, to me, is most clearly read as expressing the opposite of what Drescher meant to express.)