The description of a particular version of expected utility theory feels very particular to me.
Utility is generally expressed as a function of a random variable. Not as a function of an element from the sample space.
For instance: suppose that my utility is linear in the profit or loss from the following game. We draw one bit from /dev/random. If it is true, I win a pound, else I lose one.
Utility is not here a function of ‘the configuration of the universe’. It is a function of a bool. The bool itself may depend on (some subset of) ‘the configuration of the universe’ but reality maps universe to bool for us, computability be damned.
The description of a particular version of expected utility theory feels very particular to me.
Utility is generally expressed as a function of a random variable. Not as a function of an element from the sample space.
For instance: suppose that my utility is linear in the profit or loss from the following game. We draw one bit from /dev/random. If it is true, I win a pound, else I lose one.
Utility is not here a function of ‘the configuration of the universe’. It is a function of a bool. The bool itself may depend on (some subset of) ‘the configuration of the universe’ but reality maps universe to bool for us, computability be damned.