What evidence I know of indicates that brains do have functions somewhat distributed among physical parts—a fixed set of parallelly-operating modules. Now, this doesn’t mean that the modules will be neatly divided with well-defined interfaces like we would consider good practice, but this structure means that the way it operates is more like concurrent/distributed object-oriented programming than like function calls and large imperative procedures. So while I would reject “functions”, “layers of modules” is probably more useful than “spaghetti code” for thinking about the overall behavior of our evolved minds.
(Evolution has produced more obvious modules, too; we call them organs. I also suspect that in general “modularity” is very useful for evolvability: if you have modules then it’s more likely that a random change (which affects some modules but not the whole organism) won’t produce something completely broken.)
(Disclaimer: I am not a biologist, and I am a programmer working with distributed object-oriented systems, so I may be just doing that thing of applying the metaphors I particularly think in.)
There is certainly localization of functionality, but crazy interdependencies are common at almost all levels. Somewhat less so in many organs, but look instead at the genetic code—discrete units with particular function, but lots of unpredictable interactions and side-effects.
Also note that once you get away from straightforward organs like the heart or lungs, things get a little less clear. Consider the humble liver; it synthesizes certain proteins, produces bile, and breaks down toxins, among other assorted tasks. Why does it do all those things? Why not! Probably each was an easy hack to put into the existing organ.
I’m not saying there’s no coherent organizational structure, as that’s parently false. However, I think we should be cautious about applying metaphors that prime us to think in terms of human designs when what we’re trying to make sense of is the handiwork of Azathoth.
What evidence I know of indicates that brains do have functions somewhat distributed among physical parts—a fixed set of parallelly-operating modules. Now, this doesn’t mean that the modules will be neatly divided with well-defined interfaces like we would consider good practice, but this structure means that the way it operates is more like concurrent/distributed object-oriented programming than like function calls and large imperative procedures. So while I would reject “functions”, “layers of modules” is probably more useful than “spaghetti code” for thinking about the overall behavior of our evolved minds.
(Evolution has produced more obvious modules, too; we call them organs. I also suspect that in general “modularity” is very useful for evolvability: if you have modules then it’s more likely that a random change (which affects some modules but not the whole organism) won’t produce something completely broken.)
(Disclaimer: I am not a biologist, and I am a programmer working with distributed object-oriented systems, so I may be just doing that thing of applying the metaphors I particularly think in.)
There is certainly localization of functionality, but crazy interdependencies are common at almost all levels. Somewhat less so in many organs, but look instead at the genetic code—discrete units with particular function, but lots of unpredictable interactions and side-effects.
Also note that once you get away from straightforward organs like the heart or lungs, things get a little less clear. Consider the humble liver; it synthesizes certain proteins, produces bile, and breaks down toxins, among other assorted tasks. Why does it do all those things? Why not! Probably each was an easy hack to put into the existing organ.
I’m not saying there’s no coherent organizational structure, as that’s parently false. However, I think we should be cautious about applying metaphors that prime us to think in terms of human designs when what we’re trying to make sense of is the handiwork of Azathoth.