Yvain, I would urge you to read this post on assigning blame on the subject of diseases, written by a quite eloquent and enlightening writer. There is a very relevant snippet in there regarding the difference between the consequentialist model of blame and the deontological model.
If giving condemnation instead of sympathy decreases the incidence of the disease enough to be worth the hurt feelings, condemn; otherwise, sympathize. Though the rule is based on philosophy that the majority of the human race would disavow, it leads to intuitively correct consequences. Yelling at a cancer patient, shouting “How dare you allow your cells to divide in an uncontrolled manner like this; is that the way your mother raised you??!” will probably make the patient feel pretty awful, but it’s not going to cure the cancer. Telling a lazy person “Get up and do some work, you worthless bum,” very well might cure the laziness. The cancer is a biological condition immune to social influences; the laziness is a biological condition susceptible to social influences, so we try to socially influence the laziness and not the cancer.
If showing pictures of Salmon to British people helped degrade the salmon-pain-electrodes, then we should show pictures of Salmon to British people. If showing pictures of Mohammad to Muslim people helped reduce their reaction, then we should show pictures of Mohammad to Muslim people. If it doesn’t work, we shouldn’t do it. If kicking them in the face worked, we should do it; if kicking them in the face doesn’t work, we shouldn’t do it. Pure consequentialism.
Make no mistake, Muslims taking offense to pictures is a disease of the mind and not just because it’s based on religion (and religion is false). People have received death threats over depictions of Mohammad. Others have been assassinated for creating media relating to the Muslim religion. Those who wish to end the oppression of women and other human rights abuses have a harder time because they are unable to create media critical of those practices. These are all aside from the general issue of freedom of speech. There are real world results caused by Muslims being overly sensitive and turning to violence or threats of violence as a result of that sensitivity.
Remember that nobody felt the need to make a “Everybody Draw Mohammad Day” when they were being asked politely to stop. When sensitivity crossed the line to death threats and assassination is the exact point that an ‘issue to be sensitive about’ turned into a ‘disease to be cured’. Once it is classified as a disease the only questions are ‘how you can cure it most effectively’ and ‘is Everybody Draw Mohammad Day an efficacious cure’.
Make no mistake, Muslims taking offense to pictures is a disease of the mind
Imagine a world where there are a billion Muslims who are exactly as offended by pictures of Mohammed as the average American student would be by a racist caricature of Martin Luther King. Does one “disease of the mind” need to be cured more than the other? In both cases, the “patient” wouldn’t take a pill that cured him.
Now add to the picture one Muslim fanatic who is angry enough at depictions of Mohammed that he’d be ready to kill in retaliation. Is it worth hurting the other billion muslims to try to “cure” him (assumting the cure works, which is another question)? How many fanatics do you need before it makes utilitarian sense to use the cure?
And a lazy person probably couldn’t be bothered to go out and get the drug that cures laziness, either.
Would they? I would, if it was cheap and available enough.
There’s an important difference between things people would change if they could do it at zero cost (lazyness, disease, shyness, obesity, possibly a psychopath’s pathology), and the things people wouldn’t change even if they could at zero cost (being offended by racism, being offended by pictures of Mohammed, caring about other people). That’s why I don’t find that disease is a very good analogy.
That’s why I don’t find that disease is a very good analogy.
Some features of diseases are applicable to this situation—most aren’t, but if any of the features it does have recommend a treatment like social pressure, then ‘disease’ is a good enough analogy.
(For the record, I don’t think disease is a good analogy. The closest this situation comes to being a disease is that we don’t want them to have it; they want to keep it.)
Yvain, I would urge you to read this post on assigning blame on the subject of diseases, written by a quite eloquent and enlightening writer. There is a very relevant snippet in there regarding the difference between the consequentialist model of blame and the deontological model.
If showing pictures of Salmon to British people helped degrade the salmon-pain-electrodes, then we should show pictures of Salmon to British people. If showing pictures of Mohammad to Muslim people helped reduce their reaction, then we should show pictures of Mohammad to Muslim people. If it doesn’t work, we shouldn’t do it. If kicking them in the face worked, we should do it; if kicking them in the face doesn’t work, we shouldn’t do it. Pure consequentialism.
Make no mistake, Muslims taking offense to pictures is a disease of the mind and not just because it’s based on religion (and religion is false). People have received death threats over depictions of Mohammad. Others have been assassinated for creating media relating to the Muslim religion. Those who wish to end the oppression of women and other human rights abuses have a harder time because they are unable to create media critical of those practices. These are all aside from the general issue of freedom of speech. There are real world results caused by Muslims being overly sensitive and turning to violence or threats of violence as a result of that sensitivity.
Remember that nobody felt the need to make a “Everybody Draw Mohammad Day” when they were being asked politely to stop. When sensitivity crossed the line to death threats and assassination is the exact point that an ‘issue to be sensitive about’ turned into a ‘disease to be cured’. Once it is classified as a disease the only questions are ‘how you can cure it most effectively’ and ‘is Everybody Draw Mohammad Day an efficacious cure’.
Imagine a world where there are a billion Muslims who are exactly as offended by pictures of Mohammed as the average American student would be by a racist caricature of Martin Luther King. Does one “disease of the mind” need to be cured more than the other? In both cases, the “patient” wouldn’t take a pill that cured him.
Now add to the picture one Muslim fanatic who is angry enough at depictions of Mohammed that he’d be ready to kill in retaliation. Is it worth hurting the other billion muslims to try to “cure” him (assumting the cure works, which is another question)? How many fanatics do you need before it makes utilitarian sense to use the cure?
And a lazy person probably couldn’t be bothered to go out and get the drug that cures laziness, either. Hence the social presssure method.
Would they? I would, if it was cheap and available enough.
There’s an important difference between things people would change if they could do it at zero cost (lazyness, disease, shyness, obesity, possibly a psychopath’s pathology), and the things people wouldn’t change even if they could at zero cost (being offended by racism, being offended by pictures of Mohammed, caring about other people). That’s why I don’t find that disease is a very good analogy.
Some features of diseases are applicable to this situation—most aren’t, but if any of the features it does have recommend a treatment like social pressure, then ‘disease’ is a good enough analogy.
(For the record, I don’t think disease is a good analogy. The closest this situation comes to being a disease is that we don’t want them to have it; they want to keep it.)