How’s this for a metaphor: suppose I thought my mother had died in the Holocaust, when in fact she’d escaped the Holocaust without incident and simply lost contact with me. Someone makes Nazi jokes around me, or says that everyone who died in the Holocaust deserved it and went to Hell, or something equally offensive.
Suppose my interlocutor knows that my mother did not die in the Holocaust, and knows that if I believed my mother didn’t die in the Holocaust I wouldn’t be offended by what ey’s saying. Ey also knows that since I do believe my mother died in the Holocaust, I definitely will be offended.
Even in this situation—in which I am only suffering because I have a false belief, and for reasons directly related to that false belief—I still think my interlocutor is very much in the wrong.
Your interlucotur clearly wouldn’t be behaving nicely and would clearly be pushing for some confrontation—but does it mean that it is wrong or not allowed?
This feels the same as if (s)he simply and directly called you a jackass in your face—it is an insult and potentially hostile, but it’s clearly legal and ‘allowed’; there are often quite understandable valid reasons to (re)act in such a way against someone, and it wouldn’t really be an excuse in a murder trial (and the original problem does involve murders as reaction to perceived insults).
“Even in this situation—in which I am only suffering because I have a false belief, and for reasons directly related to that false belief—I still think my interlocutor is very much in the wrong.”
You wouldn’t be suffering only because you had a false belief, another reason would be that you weren’t sufficiently thick skinned to decline to be offended.
“Someone makes Nazi jokes around me, or says that everyone who died in the Holocaust deserved it and went to Hell, or something equally offensive.”
At this point I would ask myself “Of what consequence is this person’s opinion to me”? And I’d instantly conclude: None.
To cause me real pain a statement would have to be justified in my own judgment.
How’s this for a metaphor: suppose I thought my mother had died in the Holocaust, when in fact she’d escaped the Holocaust without incident and simply lost contact with me. Someone makes Nazi jokes around me, or says that everyone who died in the Holocaust deserved it and went to Hell, or something equally offensive.
Suppose my interlocutor knows that my mother did not die in the Holocaust, and knows that if I believed my mother didn’t die in the Holocaust I wouldn’t be offended by what ey’s saying. Ey also knows that since I do believe my mother died in the Holocaust, I definitely will be offended.
Even in this situation—in which I am only suffering because I have a false belief, and for reasons directly related to that false belief—I still think my interlocutor is very much in the wrong.
Your interlucotur clearly wouldn’t be behaving nicely and would clearly be pushing for some confrontation—but does it mean that it is wrong or not allowed? This feels the same as if (s)he simply and directly called you a jackass in your face—it is an insult and potentially hostile, but it’s clearly legal and ‘allowed’; there are often quite understandable valid reasons to (re)act in such a way against someone, and it wouldn’t really be an excuse in a murder trial (and the original problem does involve murders as reaction to perceived insults).
You wouldn’t be suffering only because you had a false belief, another reason would be that you weren’t sufficiently thick skinned to decline to be offended.
At this point I would ask myself “Of what consequence is this person’s opinion to me”? And I’d instantly conclude: None.
To cause me real pain a statement would have to be justified in my own judgment.