If your utility function includes stuff you want to minimize, then you cannot a priori rule out that freezing the world may be the best outcome, as this would depend on empirical circumstances. It seems weird to me why anyone would reject a value judgement based on a conclusion that is a possibility for all value systems (or at least the ones that contain minimization); this would be getting it backwards, I think.
Also note that my initial comment was about reglaciation, which doesn’t necessarily imply the extinction of all life on earth. All else being equal, wouldn’t it be better to reduce the amount of wild animals, if it is empirically the case that the vast majority of wild animals die shortly after birth in ways that are presumably painful? If your answer is “That looks like deathophilia”, then I’m somewhat lost to be honest.
Finally, depending one one’s view, there is a relevant difference between death an non-existence. One could think that one poses a problem whereas the other doesn’t.
Even if you think animal suffering is bad enough that it would be a good idea to kill them all, reglaciation is just a bizarre way of achieving this. First of all it doesn’t actually kill off all animals. Also it would be an amazingly slow and destructive and expensive and… stupid way of killing things.
I wasn’t commenting on practical strategies about reducing the number of wild animals. All I was saying is that there are positive consequences of reglaciation and that they might outweigh the negative consequences. Of course, there are probably ways to bring about the positive consequences faster and more effectively while still preventing the negative ones.
(Don’t interpret too much into my account name here, I didn’t even realize how fitting it was to this discussion until you pointed it out.)
If your utility function includes stuff you want to minimize, then you cannot a priori rule out that freezing the world may be the best outcome, as this would depend on empirical circumstances. It seems weird to me why anyone would reject a value judgement based on a conclusion that is a possibility for all value systems (or at least the ones that contain minimization); this would be getting it backwards, I think.
Also note that my initial comment was about reglaciation, which doesn’t necessarily imply the extinction of all life on earth. All else being equal, wouldn’t it be better to reduce the amount of wild animals, if it is empirically the case that the vast majority of wild animals die shortly after birth in ways that are presumably painful? If your answer is “That looks like deathophilia”, then I’m somewhat lost to be honest.
Finally, depending one one’s view, there is a relevant difference between death an non-existence. One could think that one poses a problem whereas the other doesn’t.
Even if you think animal suffering is bad enough that it would be a good idea to kill them all, reglaciation is just a bizarre way of achieving this. First of all it doesn’t actually kill off all animals. Also it would be an amazingly slow and destructive and expensive and… stupid way of killing things.
I wasn’t commenting on practical strategies about reducing the number of wild animals. All I was saying is that there are positive consequences of reglaciation and that they might outweigh the negative consequences. Of course, there are probably ways to bring about the positive consequences faster and more effectively while still preventing the negative ones. (Don’t interpret too much into my account name here, I didn’t even realize how fitting it was to this discussion until you pointed it out.)
Reglaciation precludes many other possibilities, so the opportunity costs must be considered as well.