If truth is a bad idea, it’s not clear what the reader is doing on Less Wrong [...]
Believing the truth is usually a good idea—for real organisms.
However, I don’t think rationality should be defined in terms of truth seeking. For one thing, that is not particularly conventional usage. For another, it seems like a rather arbitrary goal. What if a Buddhist claims that rational behaviour typically involves meditating until you reach nirvana. On what grounds would that claim be dismissed? That seems to me to be an equally biologically realistic goal.
I think that convention has it right here—the details of the goal are irrelevances to rationality which should be factored right out of the equation. You can rationally pursue any goal—without any exceptions.
If truth is a bad idea, it’s not clear what the reader is doing on Less Wrong [...]
Believing the truth is usually a good idea—for real organisms.
However, I don’t think rationality should be defined in terms of truth seeking. For one thing, that is not particularly conventional usage. For another, it seems like a rather arbitrary goal. What if a Buddhist claims that rational behaviour typically involves meditating until you reach nirvana. On what grounds would that claim be dismissed? That seems to me to be an equally biologically realistic goal.
I think that convention has it right here—the details of the goal are irrelevances to rationality which should be factored right out of the equation. You can rationally pursue any goal—without any exceptions.