I know how a consequentialist (at least, one operating with the intention of maximizing ‘human values’) would unpack these questions, and I know how we could theoretically look at facts and give answers to ze’s questions.
But how, on earth, would “is polyamory the characteristic of virtuous people” get unpacked? What does “virtuous” mean here and what would it look like for something or someone to be “virtuous”?
I know you probably didn’t mean to get dragged into a conversation about Virtue Ethics, but I’ve seen it mentioned on LW a few times and have always been very curious about its local version.
Well, not being a virtue ethicist myself, I’m probably not the best guy to ask.
My question for virtue ethicists is “well, OK, but how do you tell who is virtuous?”
Then again, a virtue ethicist can just as reasonably ask “well, OK, but how do you tell what consequences are desirable?” to which I, as a consequentialist, essentially reply “I consult my intuitions about value.” Life has more value than death, joy has more value than suffering, growth has more value than stagnation, and so forth. How do I know that? Geez, I dunno. I just know.
Presumably a virtue ethicist can just as readily reply “I consult my intuitions about virtue.” I suppose it’s no less reasonable.
I know how a consequentialist (at least, one operating with the intention of maximizing ‘human values’) would unpack these questions, and I know how we could theoretically look at facts and give answers to ze’s questions.
But how, on earth, would “is polyamory the characteristic of virtuous people” get unpacked? What does “virtuous” mean here and what would it look like for something or someone to be “virtuous”?
I know you probably didn’t mean to get dragged into a conversation about Virtue Ethics, but I’ve seen it mentioned on LW a few times and have always been very curious about its local version.
Well, not being a virtue ethicist myself, I’m probably not the best guy to ask.
My question for virtue ethicists is “well, OK, but how do you tell who is virtuous?”
Then again, a virtue ethicist can just as reasonably ask “well, OK, but how do you tell what consequences are desirable?” to which I, as a consequentialist, essentially reply “I consult my intuitions about value.” Life has more value than death, joy has more value than suffering, growth has more value than stagnation, and so forth. How do I know that? Geez, I dunno. I just know.
Presumably a virtue ethicist can just as readily reply “I consult my intuitions about virtue.” I suppose it’s no less reasonable.