In a previous discussion you unconvincingly stated that killing a villain would be sad, but now the answer “yes” seems to require that the villain is morally irrelevant. Is there other reason for your “yes” answer that doesn’t rely on Hitler’s terminal moral irrelevance? (It’s unclear how your second paragraph relates to the answer you’ve given.)
It is seldom wise to engage in discussion that opens with indications of aggression. All my replies to your various other accusations still apply in their various context and I do not want to extend them further. I will note with respect to this context in particular that you misread my response.
but now the answer “yes” seems to require that the villain is morally irrelevant. Is there other reason for your “yes” answer that doesn’t rely on Hitler’s terminal moral irrelevance?
You threw ‘terminal’ in there gratuitously because it sounds bad. That wasn’t part of the question. If the question was actually about killing Hitler I would probably actually leave him alive. That sort of drastic change is dangerous. In this world we do have a chance of surviving into the future, even if that task is difficult. I don’t know what a world with Hitler killed would look like. Hitler is big as far as butterflys go. But this is just a small side point.
If you read somewhat more closely you will notice that I make an abstract point about a mistake in reasoning in labeling the scenario punishment in particular. I haven’t said whether I value Hitler’s experience of life positively negatively or neutrally. I can say that I value Hitler having $40 less than me having $40. So if some messed up Omega with a time machine ever offers me the chance to knock off Hitler’s wallet I’m totally going to do it. You can (try to) shame me when it happens.
It is seldom wise to engage in discussion that opens with indications aggression. All my replies to your various other accusations still apply in their various context and I do not want to extend them further.
Just explaining the context for finding your current reply interesting (it is true that your statements didn’t convince me, whatever their other qualities or however socially inappropriate this whole line of discussion is).
You threw ‘terminal’ in there gratuitously because it sounds bad.
No, I added this for specificity, because it seems to be the only source of reasons to not mug Hitler, I don’t see how it would be instrumentally incorrect to do so given the problem statement. Hence, one salient hypothesis for why one decides to mug Hitler is that this source of reasons not to do so doesn’t move them (but, obviously, this is just a hypothesis to consider, not strong enough to be believed outright, since there could be other reasons I didn’t consider, or nontrivial implication of this reason that lead to the opposite conclusion, or the reason turns out not to be strong enough).
I can say that I value Hitler having $40 less than me having $40.
Oh, actually I didn’t consider that, if the problem was stated so I’d agree that it’s the thing to do, and the decision would have no Hitler-specificity to it. It would even be an instrumentally good decision, since I could invest the money to cause more goodness that Hitler would (here, some Hitler-specificity is necessary).
But the problem isn’t stated so, it’s not symmetrical, it’s about “ruining his evening”, which a lost opportunity to add $40 to my net worth won’t cause for me.
You can (try to) shame me when it happens.
Irrelevant to my intentions, I’m asking what’s right, not presuming what’s right.
But the problem isn’t stated so, it’s not symmetrical, it’s about “ruining his evening”, which a lost opportunity to add $40 to my net worth won’t cause for me.
I disagree with you on how the problem was stated—“ruining his evening” isn’t the only effect. You also get 40 dollars.
But even with a rephrasing that’d use the words “burning Hitler’s wallet’ instead (so that there’s no benefit of 40 dollars for me) I might value satisfying my sadistic desire to ruin Hitler’s evening more than I valued Hitler keeping his 40 dollars. Or not—it depends how much I tolerated sadism against evil dictators in myself.
That doesn’t mean I would kill Hitler for the emotional satisfaction (always assuming there’s no measurable difference one way or another to future horrors): I value human life (even Hitler’s life) more than I value my brief personal emotional satisfaction at having vengeance done.
In a previous discussion you unconvincingly stated that killing a villain would be sad, but now the answer “yes” seems to require that the villain is morally irrelevant. Is there other reason for your “yes” answer that doesn’t rely on Hitler’s terminal moral irrelevance? (It’s unclear how your second paragraph relates to the answer you’ve given.)
It is seldom wise to engage in discussion that opens with indications of aggression. All my replies to your various other accusations still apply in their various context and I do not want to extend them further. I will note with respect to this context in particular that you misread my response.
You threw ‘terminal’ in there gratuitously because it sounds bad. That wasn’t part of the question. If the question was actually about killing Hitler I would probably actually leave him alive. That sort of drastic change is dangerous. In this world we do have a chance of surviving into the future, even if that task is difficult. I don’t know what a world with Hitler killed would look like. Hitler is big as far as butterflys go. But this is just a small side point.
If you read somewhat more closely you will notice that I make an abstract point about a mistake in reasoning in labeling the scenario punishment in particular. I haven’t said whether I value Hitler’s experience of life positively negatively or neutrally. I can say that I value Hitler having $40 less than me having $40. So if some messed up Omega with a time machine ever offers me the chance to knock off Hitler’s wallet I’m totally going to do it. You can (try to) shame me when it happens.
Just explaining the context for finding your current reply interesting (it is true that your statements didn’t convince me, whatever their other qualities or however socially inappropriate this whole line of discussion is).
No, I added this for specificity, because it seems to be the only source of reasons to not mug Hitler, I don’t see how it would be instrumentally incorrect to do so given the problem statement. Hence, one salient hypothesis for why one decides to mug Hitler is that this source of reasons not to do so doesn’t move them (but, obviously, this is just a hypothesis to consider, not strong enough to be believed outright, since there could be other reasons I didn’t consider, or nontrivial implication of this reason that lead to the opposite conclusion, or the reason turns out not to be strong enough).
Oh, actually I didn’t consider that, if the problem was stated so I’d agree that it’s the thing to do, and the decision would have no Hitler-specificity to it. It would even be an instrumentally good decision, since I could invest the money to cause more goodness that Hitler would (here, some Hitler-specificity is necessary).
But the problem isn’t stated so, it’s not symmetrical, it’s about “ruining his evening”, which a lost opportunity to add $40 to my net worth won’t cause for me.
Irrelevant to my intentions, I’m asking what’s right, not presuming what’s right.
I disagree with you on how the problem was stated—“ruining his evening” isn’t the only effect. You also get 40 dollars.
But even with a rephrasing that’d use the words “burning Hitler’s wallet’ instead (so that there’s no benefit of 40 dollars for me) I might value satisfying my sadistic desire to ruin Hitler’s evening more than I valued Hitler keeping his 40 dollars. Or not—it depends how much I tolerated sadism against evil dictators in myself.
That doesn’t mean I would kill Hitler for the emotional satisfaction (always assuming there’s no measurable difference one way or another to future horrors): I value human life (even Hitler’s life) more than I value my brief personal emotional satisfaction at having vengeance done.