The affective conflationary alliance discussion is interesting (it likely would’ve been better standalone). This has implications for the architecture of internal judgement, dangers of forming conflationary alliances among your own understandings when making holistic judgements. This is a distinction between non-specific contemplation of some decision for an extended period of time, and doing detailed analyses from dubious technical premises followed by dismissal of the poorly founded but legible conclusions and settling the matter with an intuitive overall judgement that’s only very implicitly informed by that process.
But also, hard decisions matter less, the issue with conflationary alliances is more about the reigning norms being opposed to specificity, rather than about methodologies for making good decisions in particular cases. The methodological problem is about the effect of these norms, rather than about the effect (on the decisions) of the dynamics that feed the norms. The dynamics that feed the attractor norms aren’t necessarily directly anti-epistemic at all, a snap decision not informed by throwaway detailed analyses isn’t necessarily meaningfully worse than going through the exercise of a detailed analysis, because most decisions that matter won’t be that hard anyway, it would be possible to get good answers with less reasoning. The problem is the externalities of feeding the norms that eventually take over the efficient snap decisions and break their sanity, making them systematically wrong even for the easy decisions. (And of course the technical exercises also have the positive externalities of informing any future snap judgements, and feed the norms of finding occasions to do more exercises.)
The affective conflationary alliance discussion is interesting (it likely would’ve been better standalone). This has implications for the architecture of internal judgement, dangers of forming conflationary alliances among your own understandings when making holistic judgements. This is a distinction between non-specific contemplation of some decision for an extended period of time, and doing detailed analyses from dubious technical premises followed by dismissal of the poorly founded but legible conclusions and settling the matter with an intuitive overall judgement that’s only very implicitly informed by that process.
But also, hard decisions matter less, the issue with conflationary alliances is more about the reigning norms being opposed to specificity, rather than about methodologies for making good decisions in particular cases. The methodological problem is about the effect of these norms, rather than about the effect (on the decisions) of the dynamics that feed the norms. The dynamics that feed the attractor norms aren’t necessarily directly anti-epistemic at all, a snap decision not informed by throwaway detailed analyses isn’t necessarily meaningfully worse than going through the exercise of a detailed analysis, because most decisions that matter won’t be that hard anyway, it would be possible to get good answers with less reasoning. The problem is the externalities of feeding the norms that eventually take over the efficient snap decisions and break their sanity, making them systematically wrong even for the easy decisions. (And of course the technical exercises also have the positive externalities of informing any future snap judgements, and feed the norms of finding occasions to do more exercises.)