Indirectly, though, what experience do you expect if there are 100 universes exactly the same as our in every detail, as opposed to if there is only 1 such universe?
Since we’re postulating multiple universes, that’s probably pretty unlikely though. I would expect to have an increased probability of existing in a universe with more copies, proportionally to the number of copies.
So, let’s suppose there is a universe A which exists only once, and a universe B which exactly repeats forever. Those universes are different, but a situation of “me, now” can happen in both of them. (Both universes happen to contain the same configuration of particles in a limited space at some time.) Then, I should expect to be in the universe B, because that is infinitely more probable.
Unfortunately, I don’t know whether I just wrote a nonsensical sequence of words, or whether there is some real meaning in them.
I’m modeling this as if we have an (unbounded) computer executing all possible programs, some of which involve intelligences.. usually embedded in a universe. The usual dovetailer model, that is.
In the case you described, there would be two programs involved. One computes my life once, and then halts. The second runs the same program as the first, but in an infinite loop. And yes, in this case I would expect to find myself in program B in most samples. (Although, as I wrote that, there’s no way to tell the difference.. make the obvious correction to fix that.)
I described it as all possible programs, though, which would certainly include things such as boltzmann brains. The reason I don’t see that as a problem is.. the computational density of (my?) mind, strictly speaking, is what matters; not just the total number of instantiations, which over an infinite runtime is a nonsensical thing to ask about. Certainly there would be an infinite number of boltzmann brains, but they’re rare; much rarer than, say, a cyclic universe.
Well. That said, the apparent scarcity of life in this universe, as opposed to computation-hungry but boring things like stars, seems to be a decent counterargument. I’m not sure how it’d work out, really. :O
I’m inclined to think “yes”, actually. I think redundancy matters..
Before expounding on that, though, could you point me at any material that says it doesn’t?
I have no material that directly says that.
Indirectly, though, what experience do you expect if there are 100 universes exactly the same as our in every detail, as opposed to if there is only 1 such universe?
The same, if that was the entirety of existence.
Since we’re postulating multiple universes, that’s probably pretty unlikely though. I would expect to have an increased probability of existing in a universe with more copies, proportionally to the number of copies.
So, let’s suppose there is a universe A which exists only once, and a universe B which exactly repeats forever. Those universes are different, but a situation of “me, now” can happen in both of them. (Both universes happen to contain the same configuration of particles in a limited space at some time.) Then, I should expect to be in the universe B, because that is infinitely more probable.
Unfortunately, I don’t know whether I just wrote a nonsensical sequence of words, or whether there is some real meaning in them.
No, it sounds pretty meaningful to me.
I’m modeling this as if we have an (unbounded) computer executing all possible programs, some of which involve intelligences.. usually embedded in a universe. The usual dovetailer model, that is.
In the case you described, there would be two programs involved. One computes my life once, and then halts. The second runs the same program as the first, but in an infinite loop. And yes, in this case I would expect to find myself in program B in most samples. (Although, as I wrote that, there’s no way to tell the difference.. make the obvious correction to fix that.)
I described it as all possible programs, though, which would certainly include things such as boltzmann brains. The reason I don’t see that as a problem is.. the computational density of (my?) mind, strictly speaking, is what matters; not just the total number of instantiations, which over an infinite runtime is a nonsensical thing to ask about. Certainly there would be an infinite number of boltzmann brains, but they’re rare; much rarer than, say, a cyclic universe.
Well. That said, the apparent scarcity of life in this universe, as opposed to computation-hungry but boring things like stars, seems to be a decent counterargument. I’m not sure how it’d work out, really. :O