Yes, for me the problem is moving a mind from a biological substrate to a digital one. It’s hard for me to imagine you’re actually moving the original, not just making a copy. Maybe there’s some way to do it, so I’m not totally confident.
I also imagine it as making a copy, but I’d also expect that people who want their mind uploaded would know of this and would hold their identity such that they consider the copy(ies) to be themself as well. I’m not sure I’d endorse this view of identity,[1] but I don’t really have any issues with people taking it. Does your view on “the original” break with this, or would you just then consider the copy similarly to how you would whole brain emulation? (or something else)
I’m not sure I really endorse any view of identity or think it’s a coherent concept, but at the very least I think making a copy of something doesn’t make something that is that thing.
Yes, for me the problem is moving a mind from a biological substrate to a digital one. It’s hard for me to imagine you’re actually moving the original, not just making a copy. Maybe there’s some way to do it, so I’m not totally confident.
I also imagine it as making a copy, but I’d also expect that people who want their mind uploaded would know of this and would hold their identity such that they consider the copy(ies) to be themself as well. I’m not sure I’d endorse this view of identity,[1] but I don’t really have any issues with people taking it. Does your view on “the original” break with this, or would you just then consider the copy similarly to how you would whole brain emulation? (or something else)
Or at least, I think it would be very risky to get rid of my biological self based on such a view
I’m not sure I really endorse any view of identity or think it’s a coherent concept, but at the very least I think making a copy of something doesn’t make something that is that thing.